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Abstract
Evolutionary Transitions in Individuality (ETI) have been responsible for the major transitions in levels of selection and 
individuality in natural history, such as the origins of prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells, multicellular organisms, and eusocial 
insects. The integrated hierarchical organization of life thereby emerged as groups of individuals repeatedly evolved into 
new and more complex kinds of individuals. The Social Protocell Hypothesis (SPH) proposes that the integrated hierarchical 
organization of human culture can also be understood as the outcome of an ETI—one that produced a “cultural organism” (a 
“sociont”) from a substrate of socially learned traditions that were contained in growing and dividing social communities. 
The SPH predicts that a threshold degree of evolutionary individuality would have been achieved by 2.0–2.5 Mya, followed 
by an increasing degree of evolutionary individuality as the ETI unfolded. We here assess the SPH by applying a battery of 
criteria—developed to assess evolutionary individuality in biological units—to cultural units across the evolutionary his-
tory of Homo. We find an increasing agreement with these criteria, which buttresses the claim that an ETI occurred in the 
cultural realm.
Keywords Cultural evolution · Cultural group selection · Evolutionary transitions in individuality · Human evolution · 
Social protocell · Sociont
Introduction
Traditional behaviors are found in many animal species 
(Galef and Laland 2005; Allen 2019), but only in Homo have 
they coalesced into integrated and shared cultural systems 
(e.g., Andersson et al. 2014a; Smaldino 2014; Richerson 
et al. 2016; Buskell et al. 2019; Read and Andersson 2019), 
and only Homo has come to specialize in maintaining and 
acting within such systems (e.g., via expanded cognitive and 
metacognitive functions; Sherwood et al. 2008; Csibra and 
Gergely 2011; Whiten and Erdal 2012; Shea et al. 2014; 
Sherwood and Gómez-Robles 2017; Dunstone and Caldwell 
2018). The integrated cultural nature of human behavior is 
strikingly expressed in emblematic feats of cooperation and 
coordination—such as when hunting like “a highly competi-
tive group-level predator” (Whiten and Erdal 2012)—but it 
also permeates the human way of life entirely and into its 
most minute details. For example, resources obtained using 
cultural hunting and foraging strategies go on to enter an 
intricate cultural “metabolic system” where they are pro-
cessed, stored, distributed, disposed, and turned into a wide 
variety of products. These products themselves are part of 
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the operation of this cultural system, which is much wider 
and older than its individual human stewards, who depend 
on it for their survival (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 2000; Hen-
rich and McElreath 2003). This uniquely human “cultural 
community” embodies an emergent ecological strategy that 
cannot be reduced either to its learned or its genetic com-
ponents (1992).
In many ways, this sounds more like the description of 
an organism than of an animal social community—except 
perhaps for some species of social insects, whose commu-
nities can be understood as an unusual type of organism, 
due in part to the high degree of relatedness within colo-
nies (Queller 2000; Queller and Strassmann 2009; Kennedy 
et al. 2017). In human cultural communities, however, these 
integrated qualities cannot be understood genetically. While 
clearly underpinned by genetic adaptations, the exceptional 
variation of behavior seen in human communities is not 
explained by genetic variation (e.g., Lewontin 1972; Foley 
and Lahr 2011). Our genetic adaptation in this regard is indi-
rect—it permits cultural adaptation to happen.
So how could features seen as typical of (or even unique 
to) adapted biological organization emerge from a substrate 
of social learning? Are we just pushing a tempting analogy 
too far? The Social Protocell Hypothesis (SPH; Anders-
son and Törnberg 2019) proposes that this affinity between 
cultural and biological organization is genuine and fruit-
ful, and that it stems from a deep similarity in how they 
originated and evolved. More specifically, the SPH proposes 
that groups of socially learned traditions were integrated 
into a new group-level cultural entity via an Evolutionary 
Transition in Individuality (ETI; see Maynard-Smith and 
Szathmáry 1995; Michod 1999, 2007; Leigh 2010; Clarke 
2014; Hanschen et al. 2015; Szathmáry 2015). In this view, 
group-level cultural integration did not follow as a secondary 
effect of the evolution of lower-level factors that are usually 
seen as primary (e.g., cumulative traditions, hominin coop-
eration, etc.) but precisely the other way around.
ETIs are rare evolutionary transitions where new higher-
level evolutionary individuals (entities equipped to undergo 
adaptation by natural selection as wholes; Lewontin 1970; 
Buss 1987; Sober and Wilson 1994) arise from cooperating 
groups of lower-level evolutionary individuals (Buss 1987; 
Szathmáry and Maynard-Smith 1995; Queller 2000; Michod 
and Roze 2001; Hanschen et al. 2018). Repeated ETIs have 
thereby produced one of life’s most familiar characteristics: 
its hierarchical structure. For example, groups of coopera-
tive genes evolved into the first cellular genome, groups of 
bacteria-like cells evolved into the eukaryotic cell, groups 
of eukaryotic cells evolved into multicellular organisms, and 
groups of multicellular organisms evolved into social insect 
colonies.
Evolutionary individuality (Buss 1987; Michod 1999; 
Radzvilavicius and Blackstone 2018) emerges during an ETI 
via cycles of cooperation, conflict, and conflict mediation. 
Selection and adaptation thereby move to a higher level of 
organization, producing an integrated type of entity whose 
lower-level units (originally evolutionary individuals) are 
co-opted and turned into parts of the whole (Michod 1999). 
For a brief overview of ETI theory and its relation to frame-
works such as Major Transitions in Evolution, see Hanschen 
et al. (2018).
The cultural ETI described by the SPH is proposed to 
have started some 2.5 Mya, associated with the emergence 
of hominin big game carnivory and the appearance of the 
genus Homo. It is proposed to have been primed by a pre-
existing fortuitous combination of behavioral and ecological 
circumstances that imparted a basic level of evolutionary 
individuality (via community-level boundaries, heredity, 
and reproduction) to collections of unintegrated traditions 
maintained in growing and splitting early hominin social 
communities.
The transition would have taken us from “animal culture” 
to integrated cultural entities, equipped with irreducible sys-
tems for heredity, reproduction, and development on the cul-
tural group level. Traditions would evolve into increasingly 
subordinated components of a hierarchically organized cul-
tural whole. Following Andersson and Törnberg (2019), the 
hypothetical type of evolutionary individual that emerged 
in this transition is referred to as a sociont. Notably, homi-
nins are not seen as part of the emerging sociont but remain 
separate genetic evolutionary individuals.1 The SPH thereby 
introduces a notable change of perspective since “the group” 
is here a group of traditions, not of hominins.
Arguably, the most fundamental question to pose about 
the SPH is whether—and, if so, when and to what degree—
the culture of Homo shows evidence of evolutionary individ-
uality. This question has many parts. For example, is there 
evidence that selection at an early point came to act collec-
tively on combinations of animal-style traditions in hominin 
social communities? Were integrated systems of traditions 
formed as a result? Is the function and organization of Homo 
culture consistent with what one would expect if selection 
increasingly acted on cultural systems as wholes? Is there 
evidence that these proposed cultural organisms (like bio-
logical counterparts) evolved mechanisms that increased the 
extent to which they could be targets of selection? These are 
the questions we seek to address in this article.
We examine these issues by applying a set of criteria for 
assessing whether biological entities qualify as evolutionary 
1 We let the term “cultural community” represent the manifestation 
of what Andersson and Törnberg (2019) proposed as an obligate 
mutualism between Homo and sociont – i.e., the combined units of 
humans and culture. The nature of this relationship, and the evolution 
of Homo within it, is backgrounded in this article, which is focused 
on the emergence of the sociont as a cultural evolutionary individual.
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individuals (Hanschen et al. 2018), adapting them to the 
cultural realm to account for the difference in substrate. We 
begin by outlining the SPH to explain why we think that 
an ETI drove human cultural evolution, and to introduce 
the entities used in the analysis. From this basis, we apply 
our criteria to judge whether, how, to what extent, and at 
roughly what stage they are fulfilled. The analyses are then 
summarized and compared with selected types of biological 
evolutionary individuals, and the results are assessed and 
compared with theoretical expectations. We conclude by 
discussing the results and evolutionary individuality in the 
context of a set of features of human culture that appear to 
be inconsistent with our results. This article combines sche-
mata from several fields; to aid the reader we have provided 
a glossary for reference.
From Traditions to Socionts via the Social 
Protocell: An Overview
Pan as a Proxy for Early Hominins
We use the traditions and community dynamics of Pan (in 
particular the more studied common chimpanzee Pan troglo-
dytes) as a proxy for a primordial (pre-Homo) early hominin 
condition. Aware of the risk of conveniently overstating sim-
ilarities between Pan and early hominins (e.g., Sayers and 
Lovejoy 2008), our arguments rest in particular on assumed 
similarities in the following basic aspects of group behavior, 
social learning, and ecological strategy.
The diverse and broad range of traditions maintained by 
Pan include extractive foraging behaviors such as nut-crack-
ing, leaf sponging, termite fishing, and ant-dipping, along 
with a wide variety of social conventions, food choices, and 
so on (see Boesch 2012 for overview). These traditions are 
transmitted between individual apes primarily by copying 
outcomes (emulation) rather than underlying processes (imi-
tation; Tomasello et al. 1987; Tomasello 1996; Tennie et al. 
2009; Whiten et al. 2009; Clay and Tennie 2018), and they 
may be stable and potentially long-lived (Mercader et al. 
2002, 2007). Extant chimpanzees are believed to be quali-
tatively similar to the earliest hominins with regard to their 
capacity to form and maintain traditions (e.g., Whiten et al. 
2003; McGrew 2010; van Schaik 2016, p. 78), and it is likely 
that early hominins maintained traditions at a level and of a 
type similar to extant wild chimpanzees (e.g., Boesch and 
Tomasello 1998; Whiten et al. 1999, 2003; Whiten 2005; 
Lycett et al. 2009; Harmand et al. 2015).
With regard to overall community organization, Pleis-
tocene Homo appears to evolve from the basis of a Pan-
like fission–fusion type of organization, through increasing 
refinement and the addition of new and intermediate lev-
els of social organization (Grove et al. 2012; Layton et al. 
2012) —not by shifting to some radically different type of 
group organization. Of particular interest is the community 
lifecycle of Pan (Moffett 2013, pp. 239–249; Andersson 
and Törnberg 2019, p. 89). Communities arise and expire 
in irreversible, and roughly symmetric, fission events when 
social conflicts spiral out of control (Goodall 1986; Furuichi 
1987; Feldblum et al. 2018). This becomes progressively 
more likely if group size increases and overburdens social 
cognitive mechanisms for handling conflicts and maintain-
ing cohesion (Dunbar 1992, 1993, 1998). These events are 
under-researched but appear to be inherent to social features 
shared between Pan and Homo.
The Social Protocell
The centerpiece of the SPH is the so-called “social proto-
cell” model, whose name derives from the protocell model 
of how early cells arose via an ETI in a substrate of primitive 
RNA molecules (Gánti 1975, 1997; Michod 1983; Szath-
máry 1986; Szathmáry and Demeter 1987; Szathmáry and 
Maynard-Smith 1995; Norris and Raine 1998). The claim 
is that the evolution of the sociont would have followed a 
similar pathway, but in a very different substrate. We will 
now briefly review the argument by Andersson and Törnberg 
(2019).
The social protocell is a set of circumstances that, as a 
side effect of their organization, creates the potential for 
selection to act on groups of traditions contained in social 
communities (see Fig. 1). This condition is claimed to be 
incompletely present in Pan communities today, and to 
thereby likely have existed also in early hominins (Anders-
son and Törnberg 2019, pp. 90–91; see also the previous sec-
tion). The condition may be unpacked in terms of a system 
of three group-level evolutionary meta-functions: bounda-
ries, reproduction, and heredity (see Table 1).
These functions potentiate the evolution of group-level 
systems of coadapted traditions that would substantially 
expand the range of solutions achievable by social learn-
ing. Quite simply, you can do more (and different) things 
with an emergent system of traditions than you can with 
single traditions. We here refer to such adapted integrated 
systems of cultural components as institutional (Richerson 
et al. 2016). The sociont, in other words, consists of institu-
tional organization. To illustrate, we outline “the Oldowan 
carnivory institution”2 in Fig. 2 as a potential example of an 
early (ca. 2.6–1.8 Mya) institutional system of coadapted 
2 Oldowan technology was variable but saw a progression from 
simpler to more sophisticated strategies with regard to, for example, 
long-distance transportation of raw material, raw material selection, 
tool production, and hunting strategies. Our schematic illustration 
makes no claim to represent Oldowan culture as a whole or at any 
particular point in time or space.
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activities, each in distinct domains and contexts, and each 
likely supported by separately transmitted traditional behav-
ior (e.g., Roche et al. 2009).
Fitness on the level of the social protocell would be 
driven by the biological fitness contributed by traditions to 
the hominins maintaining them. If the hominins survived 
and reproduced at higher rates, so would traditions contained 
within that social protocell (Fig. 1). But if traditions pro-
vided comparably small advantages, the fate of social pro-
tocells would be decided mostly by other factors, including 
the vagaries of chance. We therefore need reasons to infer 
that some important and widely available target, for which 
sophisticated institutional strategies would yield a substan-
tial advantage, was available to early Homo but not to Pan, 
where an ETI was never initiated. Moreover, for evolution 
not to get stuck at an early point, this target must have kept 
yielding advantages as more and more sophisticated institu-
tional strategies arose.
Cracking nuts or fishing for termites may provide adap-
tive additions to the diet, but they will hardly cause chimpan-
zee communities to decisively outcompete their neighbors. 
More generally, the rainforest resources available to Pan 
occur patchily and in small packages. Beyond a certain point 
of sophistication, the returns to increasing investments will 
thereby diminish. By contrast, Homo is uniquely associated 
with a resource that could have provided a strong and persis-
tent competitive edge if pursued using cultural institutions, 
namely large carcasses. The earliest modified stone tools 
(the Oldowan complex) would have been especially useful 
for processing soft tissue on carcasses, and large game car-
nivory went on to become highly developed and foundational 
to the lifestyle of Homo during the Pleistocene—across a 
widening variety of habitats and supported by sophisticated 
cultural systems (e.g., Stiner 2002; Bickerton and Szathmáry 
2011; Whiten and Erdal 2012; Gintis et al. 2015).
But how would the social protocell get us from a Pan-
like early hominin state to simple institutions? The australo-
pithecine ancestors of Homo are believed to have gradually 
moved from facultative hunting of small animals (similar 
to Pan) toward obligate large game predation, presumably 
via facultative scavenging (for recent reviews see Thompson 
et al. 2019; Pobiner 2020). Although details are contested, 
most agree that this path involved ascending a gradient in 
risk and task complexity—driven by the benefits of access-
ing large packages of high-quality food, but facing a range 
of persistent hurdles, such as a need for processing and an 
increased exposure to predators and pathogens. Getting fur-
ther in this direction would thereby put a premium on com-
plex, coordinated, and cooperative strategies.3
As in Pan today, the social protocell would have been there 
all along as a side effect of component behaviors, maintained 
because they were adaptive in their own separate ways. Its inci-
dental effect of enabling cultural group selection would kick in 
gradually as it enabled evolution in directions that otherwise 
could not be taken. The earliest stage could, for example, have 
Fig. 1  The SPH proposes that social communities impose a group-
level lifecycle on collections of traditions, in the same way that proto-
cells did with regard to proto-biotic RNA genes. Above, we compare 
idealized renditions of biological protocells with their proposed social 
counterparts to illustrate the parallelism
3 Hominin cooperation would obviously have been strongly enabling 
in just about any sociont institutional adaptation. Culturally mediated 
facilitation, manipulation, or punishment of individuals to enhance 
cooperation and coordination would thereby be an important aspect 
of sociont adaptation. Likewise, genetic adaptation as a cooperator in 
a cultural community would be an expected outcome of a mutualistic 
relation between Homo and sociont (Andersson and Törnberg 2019, 
pp. 92–93).
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selectively preserved institutional elaborations on Pan-like 
traditional strategies, which perhaps involved late access to 
carcasses, without opposition, and the use of only immediately 
available materials such as unmodified rocks and bones. The 
social protocell would in this way have opened up an otherwise 
inaccessible cultural design space (see Stankiewicz 2000) that 
could keep expanding in co-evolution with its underpinning 
capacities in Homo.
The SPH proposes that the social protocell would thereby 
not simply boost cultural evolution but actually trigger the 
formation of the first-ever non-biotic unit of selection via an 
ETI. Key to understanding why we think an ETI may have 
unfolded is that the fortuitous meta-evolutionary functions 
imparted by the social protocell—i.e., boundaries, reproduc-
tion, and heredity (Table 1) —themselves could come under 
cultural control and be adaptively expanded and refined by 
the cultural group selection that they enabled. This can be 
understood theoretically as the evolution of evolutionary 
individuality.
Applying Evolutionary Individuality Criteria 
to Human Culture
Background
A variety of criteria have been proposed by researchers to 
define and test whether candidate entities qualify as evolu-
tionary individuals. In the following sections we will use the 
most commonly applied criteria as reviewed by Hanschen 
et al. (2017): spatial boundaries, informational uniqueness, 
informational homogeneity, indivisibility, group-level adap-
tations, division-of-labor, and the applicability of a specific 
kind of multilevel selection termed multilevel selection 2. 
These criteria identify features that are generated by and/or 
enabling of group-level selection, and that are thereby likely 
to arise during an ETI, but unlikely to be seen otherwise (in 
particular together and in a highly developed state). In this 
way we aim to test the SPH and systematically articulate the 
hypothesis in an empirical context.
For each criterion we first explain its role and importance 
with regard to evolutionary individuality. We then interpret 
these criteria in terms of cultural systems in Homo. We 
emphasize the Plio-Pleistocene origin of the sociont via the 
social protocell, its early evolutionary history (primarily in 
the Oldowan), and, finally, we consider trends across the 
evolution of Homo during the Pleistocene.
Spatial/Temporal Boundaries
Description
Boundaries constrain the components of lower-level units in 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 D. R. Davison et al.
1 3
pursuing independent agendas that require free movement. 
For example, during the origin of cellular life, the protocel-
lular lipid membrane kept autocatalytic chemical networks 
(the lower-level units in that transition) contained inside self-
replicating vesicles (see Fig. 1). Being stuck together in this 
manner facilitated the evolution of cooperation and eventu-
ally the integration of dispersed genetic information into a 
genome (Jablonka and Szathmáry 1995; Maynard-Smith and 
Szathmáry 1995; Durand and Michod 2010); see also “the 
boomerang effect” (e.g., Dugatkin 2002).
Analysis
In “The Social Protocell” section, above, we claimed that 
collections of traditions were stuck together within the 
social protocell. The boundary in this case is a lack of social 
bridges across which transmission can happen between 
communities (Table 1). The social protocell and sociont are 
thereby primarily bounded in a social rather than a physical 
space, although for Pan, and frequently (but not always) also 
for Homo, this social space corresponds to a physical space 
in the form of a territory.
Three factors that cause robust and persistent containment 
of traditions in Pan are:
1. Close and persistent social contact favors the transmis-
sion of traditions. Such contact is present within com-
munities but rarely applies between communities (e.g., 
Goodall 1986; Wilson and Wrangham 2003; Boesch 
et al. 2008; Schel et al. 2013).
2. Enculturated individuals cannot transfer freely between 
communities (e.g., Nishida et al. 1979; Pusey 1979; 
Wrangham 1979; Wilson and Wrangham 2003).
3. Enculturated individuals that do transfer are poor vec-
tors of traditions, for example, due to conformity bias 
(Whiten et al. 2005; Van De Waal et al. 2010; Haun 
et al. 2012; Luncz and Boesch 2014, 2015) and rank bias 
(Horner et al. 2010; Kendal et al. 2015; Watson et al. 
2017).
Although positive evidence is unavailable, it is quite 
plausible that the factors listed above would have applied 
similarly to early hominins in a Pliocene primordial state. 
These are primitive examples of what Durham (1992) labels 
transmission isolating mechanisms, which were subse-
quently expanded and institutionalized during the evolution 
of Homo.
One reason to suspect that the containment of culture 
increased rather than decreased in Homo is that the more 
complex culture became, the more strongly its transmission 
must have relied on close and persistent social intimacy. On 
the level of social learning, cultural components tend to be 
opaque (indeed, often both to role model and learner; e.g., 
Tostevin 2007, 2019; Premo and Tostevin 2016) and their 
transmission reliant on specialized “pedagogical” adapta-
tions (Gergely and Csibra 2006; Tehrani and Riede 2008; 
Csibra and Gergely 2009, 2011; Kline 2015; Gärdenfors and 
Högberg 2017; Laland 2017). On higher levels of organiza-
tion, increasingly complex and integrated hominin institu-
tions may have diffused less and less easily (Richerson et al. 
2016, p. 5): First, to be functional, all essential components 
of an institution must be effectively transmitted. Second, 
the institution, in turn, will be integrated into some spe-
cific higher-order system of institutions, which means it 
will likely be much less adaptive elsewhere. Third, institu-
tions, even more than focused skills, rely on liberal amounts 
Fig. 2  Consider a minimal rendition of “the Oldowan carnivory insti-
tution.” The components are behavioral traditions that occupy dis-
tinctly different regimes in terms of time, location, type of behavior, 
and materials used. Traditions such as obtaining raw material, tool 
production, and carcass processing are either pointless or impossible 
considered separately since they are adapted to be parts of an emer-
gent system that, in turn, produces something useful for the sociont 
(via the hominins) as a whole
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of tacit knowledge whose function and even existence is 
unknown to the agents (Polanyi 1967).4
Direct empirical evidence of the timing and details are 
hard to come by, but interdisciplinary analysis suggests that 
the evolution of intercommunity boundaries has a gradual 
and drawn-out history across the Pleistocene (Grove et al. 
2012). Layton et al. (2012) analyze data on the displacement 
of stone used for making artifacts (from Féblot-Augustins 
1997) from the Oldowan to the Upper Paleolithic, in con-
junction with estimated community sizes (Dunbar 1993; Hill 
and Dunbar 2003), and ethnographic as well as modeling 
analyses of area use. They conclude that movements of stone 
raw material remained mainly within small face-to-face 
coordinated social units (congruent with Pan communities) 
at least through the late Middle Paleolithic (until circa 50 
kya, although simple intercommunity institutions may have 
emerged locally before that; e.g., Blegen 2017; Brooks et al. 
2018). Exchange of lithic material may be expected to follow 
networks of amicable social interactions, and the spread of 
lithic material should therefore overlap with the transmission 
of culture. In late Pleistocene and Holocene human societies, 
social boundaries are certainly under cultural control and 
exhibit complex specializations (e.g., via cultural kinship, 
marriage, mythology, etc.; see, e.g., Read 2012). Not least 
language (e.g., via dialects) is a powerful boundary mecha-
nism, and its function as such may have been an important 
factor in its evolution; see Moffett (2013, pp. 229–232).
Temporal boundaries are imposed by the irreversible 
community-level splitting dynamic, which the SPH views 
as analogous to cell division (see Fig. 1). Social protocells, 
and later socionts, thereby have beginnings and ends.
Summary
Boundaries in a social space here play the role that physical 
boundaries play in biology, and, although social spaces are 
frequently associated with physical territories, that is not 
always the case. These boundaries exist in Pan and thereby 
plausibly in early hominins, and rather than disappearing 
over time, they seem to have become more and more effec-
tive as barriers to culture, more institutionalized, and more 
subject to cultural adaptation.
Informational Uniqueness
Description
In the biological realm, informational uniqueness essen-
tially means that each unit has its own independent genetic 
makeup. Such units may exhibit heritable individual differ-
ences, which promote evolutionary individuality by enabling 
group-level variation that selection can act upon. In the 
SPH case, the heritable information is cultural rather than 
genetic, and we see the sociont as informationally unique to 
the extent that it possesses its own stable, independent, and 
heritable set of traditions or cultural components.
Analysis
Henrich (2004) describes and reviews evidence for four 
mechanisms that promote what we here call informational 
uniqueness; see also Boyd and Richerson (2010) and Chudek 
and Henrich (2011). These mechanisms suppress within-
group variability and increase between-group variability 
in human behavior, assuming the presence of boundaries 
between groups. The first is conformist learning, which 
increases the rate of horizontal spread of favored traditions 
within a community and prevents established traditions 
from dropping out. The second is prestige-biased learning 
(Henrich and Gil-White 2001; Jiménez and Mesoudi 2019), 
which further increases between-group variation (e.g., Boyd 
and Richerson 1987) since it selectively disfavors ideas 
originating outside of the group, while it permits some 
internal sources of variation that can break up conformist 
lock-ins. The third is punishment; i.e., that the biological 
agents accept the cost of punishing nonconformers, which 
greatly amplifies the stabilizing effect of conformism (e.g., 
Boyd and Richerson 1992). Finally, normative conformity 
represents conformity for purely social reasons, regardless of 
whether the behavior in question is otherwise useful or not.
Conformism, sensu lato, is widespread among animals 
with social learning (de Waal 2013) and may contribute 
to maintaining between-group variation in chimpanzees 
(Whiten et al. 2005; van de Waal et al. 2010, 2013; Haun 
et al. 2012; van Leeuwen et al. 2012; Luncz and Boesch 
2014, 2015). However, it is a weaker force in Pan than it is 
in humans, who conform not only to gain access to better 
information, but also normatively in pursuit of social ben-
efits (e.g., Van Leeuwen et al. 2013; Haun et al. 2014). We 
thereby deem it likely that some form of conformism was 
present to some degree in early hominin communities and 
increased in Homo across the Pleistocene.
Chimpanzees may exhibit a bias towards learning from 
individuals with a high rank and/or a track record of suc-
cess (Horner et al. 2010; Kendal et al. 2015; Watson et al. 
2017). If present in early hominins, this may have worked 
4 Polanyi (1967) describes how tacit knowledge – i.e., knowledge we 
are unaware that we possess – hinders even simple acts of intentional 
transfer, even between highly similar contexts (e.g., moving equip-
ment from one factory plant to another), even if done systematically, 
with high motivation, and large resources committed.
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as an innate evolutionary starting point for “prestige” as a 
derived and culturally institutionalized version, buttressed 
by genetic adaptations (Henrich and Gil-White 2001). The 
other mechanisms reviewed by Henrich (2004) are weak, 
different, or absent in chimpanzees, and should consequently 
be viewed as derived during the evolution of Homo.
We argued above that spatial/temporal boundaries likely 
constrained horizontal (between-group) transmission before 
and (increasingly) during the evolution of Homo. Such 
boundaries to cultural dispersal, along with community-level 
heredity of sets of cultural components (via community-level 
splits; see “The Social Protocell” section), and the factors 
promoting informational uniqueness described above, indi-
cate that communities may have diverged culturally over 
time due to selection or drift, rather than converging due to 
information flow—at least if cultural inheritance was suf-
ficiently faithful.
Fidelity is important for the stable maintenance of infor-
mational uniqueness over time since it essentially bounds 
the amount of information that can be maintained by selec-
tion in a population (Eigen and Schuster 1977; Shea 2009; 
Andersson 2011, 2013). Notably, the fidelity of social pro-
tocell inheritance does not reduce to the fidelity of social 
learning, which may have been very low in early Homo (e.g., 
Tennie et al. 2017). Social protocell inheritance is simply 
the continuity of systems of specialized traditions through 
sociont reproduction events (see “The Social Protocell” sec-
tion and Fig. 1). For example, say the abilities underpinning 
the Oldowan carnivory institution were, in some instance, 
distributed somewhat unevenly across a hundred hominins in 
a community. Fidelity may then be understood as the likeli-
hood that, upon division, a sufficient number of instances of 
each needed tradition made it into the daughter communities 
to cause them to also feature this institution. This likelihood 
may be high also if the processes behind the traditions are 
transmitted with very low fidelity—as long as their functions 
are stable, which appears to potentially be the case (“Pan as 
a Proxy for Early Hominins” section).
Some degree of group-level informational uniqueness 
may thereby be theoretically expected in an early homi-
nin Pan-like state. There is also some support for this in 
field studies where substantial between-group variation in 
traditions has been found between chimpanzee communi-
ties (e.g., Whiten et al. 1999, 2001; Sanz and Morgan 2007; 
Schöning et al. 2008; Lycett et al. 2009; Boesch 2012; Koops 
et al. 2015; van de Waal 2018; Kaufhold and Van Leeuwen 
2019; Kalan et al. 2020).
Direct verification of informational uniqueness in Pleis-
tocene Homo is challenging to obtain. Evidence is poorly 
synthesized and a coherent picture is lacking (Kuhn 2020). 
Numerous individual studies, however, support an over-
all picture of ancient and persistent geographical cultural 
heterogeneity. Analysis of traces of butchering techniques 
at Bolomor Cave and Gran Dolina (Middle Pleistocene) 
shows evidence of persistent group-specific patterns that 
vary across time and space in ways that are not obviously 
functionally relevant (Blasco et al. 2013). Intercommunity 
technological variation has also been inferred archaeologi-
cally in the earliest Oldowan (at Gona; see Stout et al. 2010, 
2019), and Chinese stone tool industries between 300 and 
40 kya yield evidence of persistent regional cultural distinc-
tiveness, despite their apparent simplicity (Bar-Yosef and 
Wang 2012; Gao 2013). Foley and Lahr (2011) moreover 
suggest that cultural transmission by expansion of groups 
best explains observed patterns of geographic cultural vari-
ation over the past 100,000 years.
Summary
Taken together, informational uniqueness on the level of 
communities is present to some extent in Pan, and clearly 
present in more recent Homo. It is also indirectly suggested 




Informational homogeneity is maximized when all lower-
level units in a biological individual carry the same genetic 
information. The fitness interests of the lower-level units 
are then aligned by the fact (and to the extent) that it makes 
no evolutionary difference which unit reproduces (Hamil-
ton 1964a, b). Informational homogeneity thereby promotes 
group selection and provides an ideal setting for cooperation 
and so-called “fraternal” ETIs (Queller 1997) on the basis 
of kinship selection (e.g., Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 
1995; Michod 1999), such as when all cells in a clonally 
developing multicellular organism are genetically identical. 
In contrast, a low degree of homogeneity promotes competi-
tion and selection at the lower level, which can be problem-
atic for the emergence of evolutionary individuality at the 
higher level.
Analysis
While informational homogeneity plays a central role in 
fraternal ETIs, an evolutionary individual that arises via an 
“egalitarian” ETI (Queller 1997; such as early cells aris-
ing from different species of RNA genes, or the eukary-
otic cell arising from bacteria and archaeans) is inherently 
informationally heterogeneous. This egalitarian type of ETI 
would also be the best match for the SPH since different 
types of traditions and cultural components, specialized in 
different tasks, are clearly underpinned by different sets of 
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information. Components of culture are thereby more analo-
gous to specialized types of genes becoming integrated into 
a genome than they are to clonal cells becoming integrated 
into a multicellular organism.
In our case, the informational homogeneity criterion is 
therefore neither expected to be met from the outset, nor to 
emerge as an outcome of the ETI. But the criterion is still 
important since the analysis tells us that lower-level compe-
tition will remain a problem if the scope of group selection 
is to keep expanding via the evolution of evolutionary indi-
viduality. During an egalitarian ETI, conflicts are resolved 
by the evolution of conflict modifier mechanisms (Michod 
and Nedelcu 2003). We should expect to find examples of 
this type of mechanisms in a sociont, as we do in cells.
If competition between traditions in the emerging sociont 
is analogous to competition between genes in the emerging 
cell, then cellular mechanisms for managing and suppress-
ing genetic conflict may offer guidance. The integration of 
independently replicating RNA replicator/interactors into a 
genome is arguably the most central evolutionary innova-
tion in this regard (Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 1993). 
The chromosome is a specialized monopolistic group-level 
replicator whose operation is based on, but not reducible 
to, the original lower-level replication mechanism of inde-
pendent genes. It replicates its genetic units, and thereby the 
group-level genetic structure and proportions, in a central-
ized and controlled manner once every lifecycle (Jablonka 
and Szathmáry 1995; Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 1995; 
Durand and Michod 2010; Ågren 2014). This produces a 
setting where parasitic genes are suppressed since they 
need to become part of the chromosome to gain access to 
replication.
The evolution of the chromosome may exhibit a sugges-
tive parallelism with the highly structured and institutional-
ized enculturation process that emerged in Homo (e.g., Read 
and Andersson 2019, pp. 2–3); see also the discussion of 
related processes by Smaldino (2014, pp. 250–251). A nor-
mative canon of cultural knowledge is here transmitted in a 
structured and cumulative sequence, following a modified 
and expanded process of physiological development (child-
hood), using adaptations for cultural transmission, that are 
unique to Homo (e.g., Thompson and Nelson 2011, 2016; 
Han and Ma 2015). Such an integration and monopoliza-
tion of cultural heredity would stabilize higher-level cultural 
organization and make it more heritable, but it would also 
cause parasitic elements to be less likely to spread and dis-
rupt the function of a sociont. The ability of cultural compo-
nents to reproduce would become tied to admission into such 
a canon, which may require, for example, fitting function-
ally and logically into the prevailing system of customs and 
skills, and, not least, being considered part of the norm (see, 
e.g., contributions in Roughley and Bayertz 2019). Without 
such a normative centralized system, new traditions could 
suddenly arise to exploit some feature of the sociont or the 
hominins (cognitively or psychologically) to spread and dis-
rupt the integrated function of the sociont.
Summary
The sociont does not exhibit informational homogeneity, 
and it is not predicted by the SPH to do so. Provisionally 
an example of an egalitarian ETI, it should be expected to 
instead exhibit derived adaptations for suppressing lower-
level competition between cultural components.
Indivisibility
Description
Indivisibility means that one cannot separate the parts out 
from the whole and maintain the functional properties of 
the whole. This increases the likelihood that selection will 
act on the integrated unit rather than on separate parts. It is 
therefore indicative of evolutionary individuality if separated 
subunits do not maintain properties of the whole and can-
not survive on their own outside the group context (Michod 
1999, 2007).
One mechanism by which indivisibility can emerge is 
when components specialize and lose vital features that are 
taken over by other specialized parts; see also the “Evo-
lutionary Division of Labor” section, below. For example, 
cells in differentiated multicellular organisms have special-
ized in varied internal functions in the organism, and lost 
the ability to reproduce and survive independently in this 
process. The same fate has befallen bacterial mitochondria 
and plastid endosymbionts of eukaryotic cells, and, likewise, 
the specialized castes of social insects. Once this has hap-
pened, the fitness of one component is dependent upon other 
components of the group. Indivisibility indicates a low level 
of conflict between lower-level units since the dependen-
cies that make the individual indivisible act to align fitness 
interests on the lower level.
Analysis
Since the sociont is composed of interacting cultural compo-
nents, indivisibility means that components on any level of 
organization are unlikely to function well outside of the group 
context; see also the “Informational Uniqueness” section, 
where some problems pertaining to intercommunity transmis-
sion of cultural subunits were discussed. As a limit case, we 
may readily establish that institutions in modern-day human 
societies make little sense on their own. We could not take the 
institutions of a society and create functioning societies each 
using subsets of the parts—banking in one, police in the other, 
daycare in the first, and so on. There has to be a relatively 
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full set of complementary functional units in place. This logic 
permeates the entire internal hierarchy. Dividing institutional 
units on any level in this way incurs exactly the same set of 
problems, and the principle is particularly clearly expressed in 
technological systems, which are eminently indivisible.
This form of indivisibility is inherent to modular adapted 
systems, which we argued may have emerged early (circa 
2.6–1.8 Mya); see the “Oldowan carnivory institution” 
(“The Social Protocell” section and Fig. 2). By contrast, 
sets of traditions contained in Pan communities are divis-
ible in principle. Removing or adding one traditional prac-
tice—such as nut cracking or ant dipping—is unlikely to 
affect the function or transmission of other traditions since 
they lack interdependencies. The same would be true for a 
collection of early RNA species compartmentalized by a 
lipid membrane boundary. However, due to the protocellular 
dynamics (see Fig. 1 and Table 1) they would still not be 
divided regularly in practice. They would typically remain 
together, which would favor the evolution of dependencies, 
and thereby actual indivisibility.
Finally, while the division of socionts happens via the 
division of social groups of hominins, the former should not 
be confused with the latter (see “The Social Protocell” sec-
tion and Fig. 2). Strictly speaking, the sociont never really 
divides (see “Analysis” of the “Informational Uniqueness” 
section). It simply persists in the daughter communities after 
a split if hominins carrying all necessary traditions make it 
across. Notably, this operation is less straightforward in the 
presence of division-of-labor between hominins (craft spe-
cialization). Cliques of hominins would then carry different 
parts of the cultural information, and additional mechanisms 
would be needed to ensure that hominins of all specializa-
tions make it into both daughter communities. Craft speciali-
zation is a feature of sedentary cultural communities, and 
despite good reasons for believing it to be generally adaptive 
on a group level (e.g., Henrich and Boyd 2008), it emerged 
only very late in prehistory.
Summary
Sets of animal traditions contained in the social protocell are 
divisible in principle but rarely divided in practice. Actual 
indivisibility would then have arisen during the evolution of 
the sociont, with the sociont becoming increasingly indivis-
ible the more complex its institutional organization became.
Group‑Level Adaptations
Description
Group-level adaptations provide evidence of group selec-
tion but identifying them can be challenging. Groups can 
have features that look like group-level adaptations but 
that really are properties driven by selection on the lower 
level that filter up to the level of a group (Shelton and 
Michod 2014, 2020). Williams (1966) illustrated this by 
way of describing how a "fleet herd of deer" is really just 
a “herd of fleet deer” where the group-level property may 
be described as a "fortuitous benefit" (Williams 1966) or 
a "cross-level byproduct" (Okasha 2006) of lower-level 
properties.
Key to telling true group-level adaptations from cross-
level byproducts is to determine whether fitness has truly 
been “exported” from the lower level to the group level, or 
if the fitness of the group is simply an aggregative property 
of lower-level traits (Michod and Herron 2006; Michod 
2007). In other words, have the lower-level units sacri-
ficed their fitness as independent individuals in return for 
a greater contribution of fitness via the higher level? We 
may subject claims of group-level adaptation to a test by 
asking whether carrying implicated traits would cause the 
lower-level entities to suffer a reduction of fitness if they 
left the context of the group. Being fleet, for example, fails 
this test since being fleet would not be detrimental to a 
deer if it left the group.
Analysis
Do the components of cultural systems have properties 
that would cause them to have lower fitness if they left 
their cultural context? Are such properties linked to adap-
tive properties of the cultural system that they benefit from 
being part of? If so, we may be looking at cultural traits 
selected on the group level.
Richerson et al. (Richerson et al. 2016) conclude that 
institutions are group-level features; see also Smaldino 
(2014). Although their analysis is mostly set in relatively 
recent times, we think a similar argument can be made 
from very early on. If we pose the question formulated 
above about the Oldowan carnivory institution (Fig. 2), 
we find that its constituent components will certainly suf-
fer if moved to another setting, and that they will do so 
because of how they are adapted to serve their roles in the 
institution as an integrated whole. For example, making 
stone tools without the knowledge of how to obtain ani-
mal carcasses would be minimally beneficial and perhaps 
maladaptive. This contrasts with animal traditions (such 
as nut cracking or termite fishing among chimpanzees) 
which would seem to be equally adaptive regardless of 
the context of other traditions.5 Institutions then become 
more and more prevalent and complex the closer we get 
to modern times.
5 It should be noted that group-level features in primates is an under-
researched topic and that it cannot be ruled out that marginal exam-
ples would exist (see, e.g., van de Waal 2018).
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Summary
Group-level adaptations are absent (or marginal and not 
so far detected) in Pan communities. They seem to have 
arisen early during the evolution of Homo, whereafter they 
increased in complexity, integration, and importance. Insti-




To avoid confusion, let us first state that division of labor 
in anthropology (and in social science generally) refers spe-
cifically to craft specialization; i.e., the division of tasks 
and specializations between human individuals (e.g., Kuhn 
and Stiner 2006). Evolutionary theory uses a more general 
understanding of division of labor as a division of tasks and 
specializations between any types of components. For exam-
ple, differentiated multicellular organisms exhibit division of 
labor between specialized cell types, cells exhibit division of 
labor between organelles, and social insect colonies exhibit 
division of labor between castes. Since cultural components 
rather than hominins form the parts of the sociont, we here 
refer to division of labor as occurring between cultural 
components.
Evidence of division of labor in an entity is evidence of 
“near-decomposability,” which is a universal principle of 
organization and design (see, e.g., Simon 1962; Wimsatt 
1975; Marengo and Dosi 2005; Andersson and Törnberg 
2018, pp. 129–31) where specialized functions are broken 
down into a level hierarchy of complementary sub-functions. 
This modular organization greatly simplifies and structures 
internal organization, and is evident in all but the very sim-
plest adapted entities. It is simultaneously an outcome and a 
precondition for the evolution or design of complex adaptive 
organization. In an evolutionary context, division of labor is 
thereby evidence that fitness has been exported to the level 
of the group, and that the new higher-level entity has gained 
substantial evolutionary individuality.
Analysis
Archaeology robustly reveals a trend toward deepening 
division of labor between components of culture, both as 
observed in the products of culture (e.g., complex technol-
ogy; see Querbes et al. 2014; Haidle et al. 2015), and in what 
we refer to as institutions; see also Smaldino (2014). Under 
the criteria of Indivisibility and Group-level adaptations we 
have already described several examples of the latter, and 
the principle is clearly manifested in the Oldowan carnivory 
institution (Fig. 2), whose components are specialized in 
focused sub-tasks, most of which make sense only together 
with the other coadapted components.
This trend of diversification, hierarchization, and increas-
ing narrowness of specialization of cultural components has 
continued and accelerated into the present (e.g., expressed as 
diversity of cultural products; see Beinhocker 2006). Homo 
is qualitatively different from other animals, including Pan, 
in this regard. The traditions maintained by chimpanzees 
exhibit diversification but not integration of function beyond 
what can be achieved cognitively in creative problem solv-
ing (within the “zone of latent solutions”; e.g., Tennie et al. 
2009; Reindl et al. 2018). We take this to imply that pre-
Oldowan hominin traditional repertoires (like Pan) likely 
did not exhibit division of labor.
Notably, as the sociont is the outcome of an egalitarian 
ETI (see “Analysis” of the “Informational Homogeneity” 
section),6 the pattern of division-of-labor in the sociont 
should more resemble what we see in unicellular organ-
isms than what we see in multicellular organisms. Without 
informational homogeneity (see above) there is, for exam-
ple, no basis for the differentiation between reproductive 
and somatic components that plays a key role in fraternal 
ETIs (e.g., single- to multicellular) by strongly suppressing 
lower-level selection.
Summary
Our observations lead us to conclude that cultural evolution-
ary division of labor arose early and deepened during the 
evolution of Homo, and that it is not evident in other species 
maintaining traditions, including Pan.
Multilevel Selection 2
Description
Damuth and Heisler (1988) seminally described a subdi-
vision in the debate about multilevel selection in terms of 
two types of models: Multilevel Selection 1 (MLS1) and 
Multilevel Selection 2 (MLS2.) They characterized these 
as follows (“individual” here corresponds to our use of the 
term “lower-level”):
The criteria for MLS1 are as follows:
1. "Group selection" refers to the effects of group member-
ship on individual fitness.
6 With traditions on the lower level – not a fraternal ETI with homi-
nins on the lower level.
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2. Fitnesses are properties of individuals and group fitness 
is an aggregative property of individual fitnesses.
3. Characters are values attributed to individuals (including 
both individual and contextual characters—see below).
4. Populations consist of individuals, organized into 
groups.
5. Explicit inferences can be made only about the changing 
proportions of different kinds of individuals in the whole 
population (the meta-population).
The criteria for MLS2 are as follows:
1. "Group selection" refers to change in the frequencies of 
different kinds of groups.
2. Fitnesses are properties of groups.
3. Characters are values attributed to groups (including 
both aggregate and global characters).
4. Populations consist of groups, composed of individuals.
5. Explicit inferences can be made only about the changing 
proportions of different kinds of groups in the popula-
tion.
In essence, MLS2 models correspond to groups that are 
well on their way to becoming evolutionary individuals 
(Okasha 2006), while MLS1 models correspond to groups 
whose members do not constitute parts of a group-level indi-
vidual, and where we cannot speak of group-level adapta-
tions. Okasha (2007) furthermore remarked that there is a 
characteristic temporal ordering where MLS1 may turn into 
MLS2, so both types of dynamics may be in place at the 
same time.
Analysis
The ETI proposed by the SPH begins from an MLS1 sce-
nario in which traditions are not integrated as parts of a 
higher-level system, but simply happen to be organized into 
groups as a by-product of early hominin group behavior (see 
“The Social Protocell” section). The fitness of such a group 
is an aggregative outcome of the effects of the different tradi-
tions since any interactions between them are minimal and 
likely not synergistic. As a result of these minimal interac-
tions, characters and fitnesses may be assigned to individual 
traditions7 but not to groups thereof, except in the simple 
aggregate sense.
As the ETI progresses, institutional organization is argued 
to appear, as exemplified by the Oldowan carnivory institu-
tion (Fig. 2). Traditions here become specialized parts of 
larger functional systems. The adaptive functions of such 
institutional structure (such as contributing meat or other 
resources) are emergent, as they are determined by complex, 
nonlinear interactions between its traditional components. 
We may thereby speak increasingly of fitness on the cultural 
group level rather than on the cultural component levels, and 
we are also more and more inclined to speak also of proper-
ties of these systems as wholes. Since traditions interact and 
co-occur, change on the levels of institutions and socionts 
can also be characterized across time and space. In other 
words, traditions start out as independent entities, but they 
end up as specialized parts of larger systems.
Summary
The observations that we have made in prior sections sup-
port an interpretation where an MLS1 situation gradually 
turns into an MLS2 situation during the evolution of Homo. 
We deem that that the sociont is consistent with a MLS2 
framework, although, as in other egalitarian ETI, selection 
on the original level is never fully eliminated.
Results
In Table 2 we summarize our findings along with biologi-
cal examples for comparison. The eukaryotic cell (like the 
sociont) stems from an egalitarian ETI (eukaryogenesis) and 
is also the starting point of a fraternal ETI, namely the evolu-
tion of multicellular organisms. Colonial organisms that 
develop clonally (e.g., the volvocine green algae Eudorina 
elegans) represent an intermediate stage in this transition. 
The Pan/early hominin social protocell is a pre-ETI start-
ing point exhibiting only pre-adapted evolutionary individu-
ality. Early Homo represents the social protocell once it is 
undergoing an ETI. Homo represents the sociont, which is 
the proposed result of the cultural ETI: an integrated cultural 
unit that fulfills most of the individuality criteria.
For each applied criterion there is also a theoretical 
expectation that may be argued from the standpoint of the 
evolutionary trajectory that is invoked. For an egalitarian 
ETI beginning from “a protocellular situation,” we may pre-
dict as follows:
At the social protocell stage, informational unique-
ness should be fulfilled at least to some extent since this 
is necessary for selectable variation (this is also referred 
to as “between-group variation”). Social protocells are also 
expected to not be informationally homogenous. Many 
types of lower-level entities coexist stably within the social 
protocell as they do not compete directly (e.g., traditions 
7 We here need to keep track of the difference and linkages between 
(1) the biological fitness contribution that a traditional strategy may 
have to its carrier, and (2) the fitness of the tradition itself in terms of 
its likelihood of spreading between carriers.
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aimed at different foraging tasks). A social protocell is divis-
ible in the sense that the fitnesses of lower-level entities do 
not depend on the presence of other types of such entities. 
Although internally heterogenous, the lower-level entities 
(individual traditions) are not initially organized into sys-
tems and exhibit neither division of labor nor group-level 
adaptations at the outset. On the same account, groups of 
traditions in social protocells do not exhibit MLS 2. The 
social protocell is by definition expected to exhibit temporal 
and spatial boundaries.
Beyond the protocell, an ETI should lead to all these 
criteria being fulfilled to an increasing degree as a result 
of selection for evolutionary individuality. The exception 
is informational homogeneity, whose functional effects 
will be achieved by the evolution of other conflict modifi-
ers. The multicellular organism—our example of a fraternal 
ETI (Table 2) —should, on the other hand, be expected to 
also exhibit informational homogeneity (see Informational 
homogeneity).
We find that our assessments match up with theoretical 
expectations, as well as with the biological examples that 
we used for comparison. Our findings are consistent with 
the SPH hypothesis that a cultural evolutionary individual 
emerged as the outcome of an ETI that may be described as 
egalitarian.
Discussion
We tested the SPH by subjecting it to a range of criteria 
developed to identify evolutionary individuals (Clarke 2013; 
Hanschen et al. 2017). Many of these criteria correspond to 
mechanisms that promote selection at higher levels (Clarke 
2013; Hanschen et al. 2017). We examined Pan as a proxy 
for early hominins, evidence of culture in early Homo, and 
later Homo cultural communities. We found that later Homo 
cultural systems satisfied more individuality criteria than did 
those of early Homo, and that early Homo cultural systems 
in turn satisfied more individuality criteria than did Pan.
Taken together, our analyses indicate that evolutionary 
individuality arose, and subsequently increased, in cultural 
systems during the evolution of Homo. Since the features 
that we have tested for are unlikely to arise and become 
highly developed for other reasons, this supports the hypoth-
esis that deep-seated similarities exist between the evolution-
ary provenances of human culture and biological organisms.
But the idea that human culture would have more than 
superficial similarities with biological organisms is clearly 
controversial in biology as well as social science (see, e.g., 
Dunn 2016, pp. 11–31 for a review). We will therefore end 
by discussing the evolutionary individuality of human cul-
ture in the context of four salient differences between human 
culture and biological organisms.
Let us first briefly remark on what sort of similarities 
and differences the SPH should lead us to expect. The SPH 
implies that human cultural systems and biological organ-
isms represent outcomes of the same type of evolutionary 
process—an ETI—operating in two radically different sub-
strates, namely socially learned behavior and biochemistry 
(i.e., in the spirit of “general” or “universal” evolutionary 
theory; see, e.g., Campbell 1974; Hull 1980; Dawkins 1983, 
1992; Cziko 1995; Aldrich et al. 2008; Andersson 2008). 
The expectation is thereby that differences in outcome are 
attributable to differences in substrate rather than to funda-
mental differences in the evolutionary process.
First Difference: Are Cultural Communities More Like 
an Ecosystem?
Recent societies are more often likened with ecosystems 
than with organisms, and ecosystems would not meet the 
individuality criteria discussed in the present article (Hune-
man 2014). Like ecosystems, recent societies exhibit the 
whole range of ecological relations, including competition, 
neutralism, parasitism, commensalism, and amensalism (see, 
e.g., Sandén and Hillman 2011). This raises the question as 
to whether the SPH overstates the similarity between cul-
tural communities and biological organisms.
The time frame of the sociont (and of this study) is impor-
tant in this context. The SPH places the base of the ETI at 
circa 2.0–2.5 Mya, at which time (and earlier) face-to-face 
coordinated social communities, strongly bounded upward in 
size by cognitive capacity (e.g. Dunbar 1993; Hill and Dun-
bar 2003), were the top level of social and cultural organi-
zation. This seems to have remained the case until some 
50—100 kya when larger and more aggregated social units 
arose and became dominant during the Late Pleistocene (e.g. 
Moffett 2013, 2019; see also Spatial/Temporal boundaries). 
During the Holocene, cultural and social organization kept 
expanding dramatically in level upon level.
The sociont coincides with ancestral cultural commu-
nities of the older and smaller style. The more recent and 
larger aggregates would have required institutions extending 
between and above the level of the sociont to handle inter-
community conflicts (Gat 2010; Wilson 2013). Embedded 
in such institutions, the original sociont would need to adapt 
to new and changed roles. These aggregated cultural units 
would also be much larger, and there would be fewer of 
them, which would inhibit group selection on levels above 
that of the sociont (Traulsen and Nowak 2006). If anything, 
selection on cultural groups would thereby have waned in 
importance in an increasingly fluid multilevel organization, 
with less institutional checks on non-cooperative interactions 
(a “wicked” system; see Andersson and Törnberg 2018; 
Andersson et al. 2014b).
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There is no reason to think that these more recent higher- 
and multilevel societies would be organized in the same way 
as the sociont components that they once emerged from.The 
suitability of ecological models to recent society thereby 
does not contradict the suitability of an organismal model 
for ancient societies. The first difference thereby primarily 
stands out on a comparison between recent human societies 
and biological individuals.
Second Difference: Internally Generated Adaptive 
Traits
While biological adaptation mainly operates on randomly 
generated changes in genes and genotypes, adaptive traits 
in cultural communities (including heritable features) fre-
quently arise by internal innovation. Hominin creativity, and 
trial-and-error on a fine level of resolution, reacts much more 
rapidly than selection could have worked on variation on the 
sociont level. This internal and goal-directed nature of some 
cultural change raises the question: to what extent do we 
need cultural group selection to explain cultural adaptation?
Let us look at cultural evolution in action in more detail. 
High-resolution examples are hard to find in the deep past, 
so we will consider the emergence of a major institution 
across the interface between the late Epi-Paleolithic and the 
earliest Neolithic. Stiner et al. (2014, 2021; Munro et al. 
2018) have described in detail how sheep domestication 
arose over the course of more than a millennium at Aşıklı 
Höyük (AH; Central Anatolia) —transitioning from man-
agement of wild populations, to fully domesticated animals 
alternately penned and herded to distant pastures (see also 
Abell et al. 2019). What Stiner and colleagues describe is a 
multigenerational process where novel solutions, in an itera-
tive and cascading manner, produce new problems to solve 
and opportunities to pursue. For example, penning sheep 
within the settlement reduces losses to predators, but cre-
ates additional problems, such as with pests. These cascades 
of change propagate through society as a whole, leading in 
the end not only to a new institution, but to the integration 
of this institution as a functional component of the internal 
organization of the cultural community as a whole.
Several generalizable observations can be made in 
this example. First, humans here engage collectively in a 
dynamical and creative innovation process where solving 
problems and pursuing opportunities generates variation 
in cultural components, leading to cascades of transfor-
mations, and thereby to new problems and opportunities 
(Andersson et al. 2014a; Lane 2016). Second, while this 
new institution arises as a result of human problem-solving 
capabilities, there is no evidence (nor reason to expect) 
that ideas about the outcome—an integrated system of 
cultural knowledge and practices making up a pastoral 
economy—guided the actions taken (which applies to 
domestication generally; see, e.g., Zeder 2012, 2015). 
Humans here built an institution they cannot possibly have 
understood, they integrated it into a larger cultural system 
(that they would have understood even less), and it still 
worked splendidly; see also Lansing’s (1987) description 
of Balinese rice growing communities. Third, and most 
importantly, the cumulative innovative steps taken did not 
represent the selective replacement of sociont variants in 
a larger population, nor is it reasonable to believe that 
populations of variant institutions were maintained simul-
taneously within the community.
One possible SPH interpretation would be to view this 
(at least partly) as a developmental rather than evolution-
ary process. That is, to see innovation as the development 
of societal organization via a process that in turn is based 
on heritable cultural information, such as via what Heyes 
(2018) describes as “cognitive gadgets”; see also Ardila 
(2018), with writing and mathematics used as examples. 
Compared with biological counterparts, the degree of 
sociont developmental plasticity would truly be exceptional, 
but, then again, the affordances of a cultural organism would 
be radically different from those of a biological organism. 
Mechanisms for altering phenotypic expression via a flexible 
developmental process have clearly been strongly selected 
for, and played an important role, in biological evolution 
(e.g., West-Eberhard 2003; Sterelny 2011; LaFreniere and 
MacDonald 2013). In the sociont context, Andersson and 
Törnberg (2019) argued that one of the major advantages 
of an environmentally responsive and integrated cultural 
system could have been to leverage the high flexibility that 
generally is a trademark of great ape behavior (e.g., Ungar 
et al. 2006; Malone et al. 2012); see also, e.g., Fogarty et al. 
(2015) and Fuentes (2017b). That proposition dovetails with 
the “variability selection hypothesis” (Potts 1998, 2012; 
Grove 2011b, 2011a; Maslin et al. 2014, 2015) which argues 
that high levels of environmental variation during the early 
Pleistocene would have strongly favored any ability to rap-
idly reconfigure one’s behavior.
If so, the main targets of sociont selection and adaptation 
would not have been the detailed manifestations of culture, 
but something more toward the image of cognitive gadg-
ets (Ardila 2018; Heyes 2018); i.e., fundamental systems 
that underpin our capacity to adapt culturally by govern-
ing how we think and by harnessing the capacity of our 
large brains (Andersson and Törnberg 2019, p. 86). For 
example, the people at Aşıklı Höyük would have been in a 
position to embark on their transformation into a Neolithic 
society (once facing Holocene conditions; e.g., Richerson 
et al. 2001) because earlier cultural communities (and homi-
nins) in that lineage had accumulated, across hundreds and 
thousands of millennia, a richer and richer system of basic 
cognitive tools for dealing successfully with environmental 
change in general.
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Basic and stably present systems like these would over 
time be expected to coevolve with Homo to form “hybrid” 
systems, whose genetic and cultural elements would become 
so closely intertwined that clearly classifying them as either 
genetic or cultural is impossible. Language could provide the 
most salient example of such a system. Language is under-
pinned by genetic adaptations (e.g., Mozzi et al. 2016), but 
we learn languages, and they evolve also in their own right 
(e.g., Croft and Cruse 1987; Mufwene 2001; Greenhill et al. 
2010). Language is also far more than just a means of com-
munication. It structures the complexities of human cogni-
tion and psychology, which, essentially, makes it an operat-
ing system for our large and expensive brains. It is widely 
agreed that language must have evolved gradually from a 
protolanguage. But while a protolanguage would have been 
useful, or even necessary, for early Homo (e.g., Bickerton 
2009; Bickerton and Szathmáry 2011; in the context outlined 
in Fig. 2), it is still hard to account for its original emergence 
in terms of benefits accruing to individual hominins. The 
sociont would be expected to drive the evolution of precisely 
this type of complex and shared cultural systems that would 
become part of the selective environment of Homo.
Third Difference: Lower‑Level Selection
Cultural evolution as selection acting on populations of 
variants of cultural components that arise and spread within 
cultural communities is a well-researched and central theme 
in cultural evolutionary studies (Cavalli-Sforza and Feld-
man 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985, 2005; Durham 1992; 
Mesoudi 2007, 2011). This raises the question of how much 
selection remains in operation also on lower-level cultural 
components, and how this squares with the notion that 
lower-level selection would have been suppressed during 
an ETI?
We have identified multiple mechanisms that inhibit 
lower-level selection, as many of the individuality criteria 
correspond to mechanisms that promote higher-level selec-
tion and/or reduce lower-level selection (Clarke et al. 2013; 
Hanschen et al. 2017). But egalitarian ETIs never eliminate 
lower-level selection completely (see also the “Analysis” 
of the “Multilevel Selection 2” section). Lower-level selec-
tion could still be occurring within the sociont, as it does 
within biological individuals that have emerged in egalitar-
ian ETI. For example, selection on genes is not completely 
suppressed in cells (see, e.g., Ågren 2014).
Lower-level selection may also belong to sociont mecha-
nisms adapted specifically to increase the capacity to respond 
to the environment (i.e., as part of the types of mechanisms 
discussed as developmental in the previous section); see also 
Ziman (2000). Employing selection in such a role would not 
lack precedents. There are two major examples of biological 
organs that operate as Darwinian systems based on staged 
and adapted implementations of “blind-variation-selective-
retention” (BVSR; Campbell 1960): the adaptive immune 
system and the brain (e.g., Jerne 1955; Changeux 1985; 
Michod 1988; Edelman 1993; Fernando and Szathmáry 
2010; Müller et al. 2018). The function of these organs is 
precisely to provide the biological organism with capabilities 
for responding to the environment on timescales that are too 
short for genetic adaptation; for example, creativity, learn-
ing, and the ability to survive the onslaught of pathogenic 
microorganisms with much shorter generation times.
Fourth Difference: Boundaries and Manifestation
Biological individuals tend to be physically cohesive, and 
individuality criteria such as spatial/temporal boundaries 
and indivisibility are easy to interpret in terms of physi-
cal boundaries. The sociont, however, must be imagined 
largely in other spaces, such as social and ideational spaces. 
Are such boundaries equivalent with those in biology? We 
described sociont boundaries in the “Spatial/Temporal 
Boundaries” section but expand our discussion here with 
a tentative description of how a sociont would manifest 
itself—along with Homo—in cultural communities (see 
also the “Second Difference: Internally Generated Adap-
tive Traits” section).
On the basis of the analysis in this article, we propose that 
the phenotypic manifestation of the sociont may be pictured 
as a stationary and organized pattern of behaviors, cultural 
products, and environmental modifications—coincident 
with, and maintained by, but not identical to, a social com-
munity of hominins. It would be generated and maintained 
by the dynamical and parallel expression (by hominins) of 
cultural components, most of which are likely tacit. This 
emergent pattern would unfold in time and space as the 
expression of cultural components regulated the expres-
sion of other components (within and between brains) via 
social interactions, cultural products, and environmental 
modifications. Expressed cultural components would act by 
modulating hominin behavior via psychology, cognition, and 
metacognition.
The stationary structure of this dynamical pattern may 
be conceptualized schematically (in the manner of an 
organizational chart) as a nested hierarchy of functional 
subsystems – such as for hunting, fishing, tracking, knap-
ping, pyrotechnology, but also strategies for things like 
teaching, distributing resources, resolving conflicts, and 
so on. This organization may be unpacked all the way into 
the individual brain, where culture interfaces with our 
psychology and cognition. In terms of extent, this sys-
tem reaches only as far as the social interactions of its 
carriers—i.e., it has a boundary, and, since culture shapes 
social interactions, the nature and extent of this boundary 
is evolvable as a part of the system itself.
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Moreover, the above description of the sociont poten-
tially dovetails with other models of the dynamics and 
organization of culture within as well as between cogni-
tive agents.
For example, Heyes (2018) describes cognitive gadgets 
as not only functional but also regulatory systems, act-
ing within the brain to form adapted systems from highly 
domain-general innate components. The autocatalytic net-
work model by Gabora and Steel (Gabora and Steel 2017, 
2020) sees learning and creativity as a result of self-organ-
ization in mental representation networks. They suggest 
an extension of these dynamics to the social level, which 
could pertain to the above envisioned intra-sociont dynam-
ics, whose mechanisms would then be shaped by sociont 
evolution (or mutualistic sociont-hominin coevolution.)
Models depicting emergent "group cognition" in net-
worked human cognitive nodes, organized and medi-
ated by culture, have been proposed by several authors 
(e.g., Grove and Coward 2008; Coward and Grove 2011; 
Gallagher 2013; Muthukrishna and Henrich 2016; Read 
2020), including models where culture and its products 
themselves are depicted as part of an "external mind" 
(Clark and Chalmers 1998; Menary 2010); see Theiner 
(2014) for a review. Cultural niche construction focuses on 
complex causal feedback loops between cultural behavior 
and persistent environmental features (Laland and Brown 
2006; Smith 2007; Laland and O’Brien 2015), and net-
worked, recombining and cascading features in general 
are central in many theories of innovation in modern and 
ancient sociotechnical systems (see, e.g., Hughes 1986; 
Geels 2002; Schiffer 2005; Wimsatt and Griesemer 2007; 
Andersson et al. 2014a; Lane 2016; d’Errico and Colagè 
2018).
The description also recalls several models of biological 
innovation and organization in a recent family of models 
often referred to as the “extended evolutionary synthesis” 
(e.g., Pigliucci and Müller 2010; Feldman et al. 2015; Jaeger 
et al. 2015); for its applications to culture see, for example, 
Andersson et al. (2014a), Fuentes (2016, 2017a), Smith et al. 
(2018), and Zeder (2018). Gene regulatory networks in bio-
logical development (e.g., Arthur 2011) exhibit dynamical 
and evolutionary similarities with socio-technical innova-
tion (e.g., Erwin and Krakauer 2004). Also, the extension of 
genes, via social interactions, to group-level adaptations in 
social insects (via tactile and chemical signals as well as by 
sensing of persistent modifications of the environment) leads 
to the formation of a biological organismal unit that also 
challenges the view of organisms as physically bounded and 
contiguous entities (Dorigo et al. 2000; Queller and Strass-
mann 2009; Kennedy et al. 2017).
Future Directions
Many important issues could not be covered in this article. 
For example, while evolutionary individuality suggests 
that competition can take place on the group level, we have 
not discussed the issue of how competition actually would 
happen. Discussions of group-level competition provided 
by Smaldino (2014) and (Richerson et al. 2016) apply 
largely also to the SPH (even if the delimitation between 
genetic and cultural information is unclear in those treat-
ments), but the issue must be expanded on in future work.
Formal modelling may help to clarify the role of group-
level competition, and, in general, to investigate what 
assumptions are needed for the postulated links between 
the entities (e.g., in terms of fitnesses of traditions, homi-
nins, and socionts) to operate as claimed, and to explore 
phenomena in populations and over time.
Future work should also examine derived human traits 
such as cooperation, altruism, and language in the context 
of the sociont and the proposed mutualistic partnership 
with Homo. This relation must be worked out theoreti-
cally, via models, via empirical examples, as well as via 
revisiting frameworks such as those mentioned in the 
previous section, including not least models of coevolu-
tion between Homo and cultural systems (Durham 1992; 
Herrmann et al. 2007; Smith 2007; Laland and O’Brien 
2015; Fernandes and Woodley of Menie 2017; Hare 2017; 
Colagè and d’Errico 2018).
It would have high diagnostic value if features of cul-
ture and/or humans could be demonstrated to be adapted 
to evolutionary meta-functions of the sociont (see above). 
Generally, the prediction that culture was shaped by the 
same processes that generate organismic form in biology 
should be further explored. The concept of “organismal-
ity” (e.g., Queller and Strassmann 2009; West and Kiers 
2009; Strassmann and Queller 2010) here represents an 
attempt to understand what it means to be an organism in 
the abstract, and it may serve as a useful starting point.
As argued in “The Social Protocell” section and the 
“Analysis” in the “Informational Uniqueness” section, we 
may imagine high-fidelity inheritance of “proto-institu-
tions” as systems of functions before high-fidelity social 
learning enabled cumulative evolution of the processes 
underpinning the functions. This requires only the func-
tions to be stable, which may be the case also if they are 
underpinned by processes that are constantly reinvented 
rather than inherited (i.e., emulated rather than imitated). 
Such a proto-cultural phase would require laxer assump-
tions about early hominin cognitive evolution than a direct 
move from emulation to an inheritance system based on 
high-fidelity imitation (see, e.g., Shea 2009).
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Finally, do marginal proto-institutions exist in Pan? If 
they do, they could provide simple analogs for a proto-cul-
tural stage of the evolution of human culture. Such systems 
may have emerged and remained marginal if combinations 
of stable socially learned behaviors produced adaptive 
effects on the community level, but without the open-end-
edness argued to apply to big game carnivory. Read (2012, 
pp. 99–104), for example, describes substantial intraspecies 
regional variability in collective group behavior in Pan, 
such as in how border patrols are organized, without evident 
genetic differences to explain this variation.
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Glossary 
Tradition Patterns of thinking and behavior (e.g., food preferences, 
foraging strategies, tools, social customs, etc.) that persist across gen-
erations due to social learning. Widespread among animals, traditions 
are foremostly adapted by creative problem solving, but with a potential 
for limited Darwinian selection arising from repeated cycles of learning 
and application of variant instances held by different learners.
Cultural component Human cultural systems cannot generally be 
resolved into identifiable discrete traditions. To denote the parts of 
cultural systems more generally we speak instead of cultural compo-
nents. For particularly large and integrated cultural components we 
speak of institutions.
Culture We reserve the term culture for integrated and adapted sys-
tems of cultural components (originally traditions.) Only the genus 
Homo supports culture in this view, and “an animal culture” is simply 
a collection of stand-alone traditions without significant interactions 
between them (see also Galef 1992; Read and Andersson 2019).
Social protocell A system of independent features of social group 
behavior and learning that together creates (as a side effect) a potential 
for sets of animal traditions to be selected together. Like the biologi-
cal protocell – which plays a key role in the origin of cellular life – it 
imparts essential meta-evolutionary functions (reproduction, hered-
ity, and containment) to a potential future group-level evolutionary 
individual.
Evolutionary individual An evolutionary individual is an integrated 
higher-level unit of selection and adaptation in which selection of 
lower levels components is restricted. For instance, the multicellular 
organism is an individual as selection at the lower level of the cell is 
restricted.
Sociont The SPH proposes that groups of tradition evolved into a new 
kind of group-level cultural entity, termed a sociont, comprised of 
integrated cultural components (i.e., institutions.) The potential that 
evolving institutions may improve the efficiency of meta-evolutionary 
functions is the evolution of evolutionary individuality that we inves-
tigate in this paper.
Cultural community A social community of animals (in practice 
Homo) whose behaviors are largely governed by a cultural system 
that they enact, maintain, and transmit. Following the proposition by 
Andersson and Törnberg (2019), it is seen here as an obligate mutual-
istic partnership between Homo and sociont.
Evolutionary Transition in Individuality (ETI) Groups of individuals 
become a new kind of individual. In an ETI, formerly independent 
lower-level evolutionary individuals are integrated into a new group-
level evolutionary individual. The lower-level entities cease, wholly 
or partly, to be evolutionary individuals in their own right – such as 
cells in a multicellular organism or organelles (e.g., mitochondria) in 
eukaryotic cells.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-
bution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adapta-
tion, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long 
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, 
provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes 
were made. The images or other third party material in this article are 
included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated 
otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in 
the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not 
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will 
need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a 
copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen ses/ by/4. 0/.
References
Abell JT, Quade J, Duru G, Mentzer SM, Stiner MC, Uzdurum M, 
Özbaşaran M (2019) Urine salts elucidate early Neolithic animal 
management at Aşikli Höyük, Turkey. Sci Adv 5(4).
Ågren JA (2014) Evolutionary transitions in individuality: insights 
from transposable elements. Trends Ecol Evol 29(2):90–96
Aldrich HE, Hodgson GM, Hull DL, Knudsen T, Mokyr J, Vanberg 
VJ (2008) In defence of generalized darwinism. J Evol Econ 
18:577–596
Allen JA (2019) Community through culture: from insects to whales: 
how social learning and culture manifest across diverse animal 
communities. BioEssays 41(11):1–8
Andersson C (2008) Sophisticated selectionism as a general theory of 
knowledge. Biol Philos 23(2):229–242
Andersson C (2011) Palaeolithic punctuations and equilibria: did reten-
tion rather than invention limit technological evolution? Palaeo-
Anthropology 243–259
Andersson C (2013) Fidelity and the emergence of stable and cumula-
tive sociotechnical systems. PalaeoAnthropology 2013:88–103
Andersson C, Törnberg A, Törnberg P (2014a) An evolutionary 
developmental approach to cultural evolution. Curr Anthropol 
55(2):154–174
Andersson C, Törnberg A, Törnberg P (2014b) Societal systems: com-
plex or worse? Futures 63:145–157
Andersson C, Törnberg P (2018) Wickedness and the anatomy of com-
plexity. Futures 95:118–138
Andersson C, Törnberg P (2019) Toward a macroevolutionary theory of 
human evolution: the social protocell. Biol Theory 14(2):86–102
Ardila A (2018) Historical development of human cognition. Springer 
Nature, Singapore
Arthur W (2011) Evolution: a developmental approach. Wiley-Black-
well, Chicester
Bar-Yosef O, Wang Y (2012) Paleolithic archaeology in China. Annu 
Rev Anthropol 41:319–335
 D. R. Davison et al.
1 3
Beinhocker E (2006) The origin of wealth: evolution, complexity, and 
the radical remaking of economics. Harvard Business School 
Press, Boston
Bickerton D (2009) Adam’s tongue. Macmillan Press, New York
Bickerton D, Szathmáry E (2011) Confrontational scavenging as a 
possible source for language and cooperation. BMC Evol Biol 
11(1):261
Blasco R, Rosell J, Domínguez-Rodrigo M, Lozano S, Pastó I, Riba 
D et al (2013) Learning by heart: cultural patterns in the faunal 
processing sequence during the middle pleistocene. PLoS One 
8(2). https:// doi. org/ 10. 1371/ journ al. pone. 00558 63
Blegen N (2017) The earliest long-distance obsidian transport: evi-
dence from the ∼200 Ka Middle Stone Age Sibilo School Road 
Site, Baringo, Kenya. J Hum Evol 103:1–19
Boesch C (2012) Wild cultures: a comparison between chimpanzee 
and human cultures. Cambridge University Press, New York
Boesch C, Crockford C, Herbinger I, Wittig R, Moebius Y, Nor-
mand E (2008) Intergroup conflicts among chimpanzees in taï 
national park: lethal violence and the female perspective. Am 
J Primatol 70(6):519–532
Boesch C, Tomasello M (1998) Chimpanzee and human cultures. 
Curr Anthropol 39(5):591–614
Boyd RT, Richerson PJ (1985) Culture and the evolutionary process. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Boyd RT, Richerson PJ (1987) The evolution of ethnic markers. Cult 
Anthropol 2(1):65–79
Boyd RT, Richerson PJ (1992) Punishment allows the evolution of 
cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethol Socio-
biol 13(3):171–195
Boyd RT, Richerson PJ (2000) Memes: universal acid or a better 
mouse trap? In: Aunger R (ed) Darwinizing culture: the status 
of memetics as a science. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
pp 143–162
Boyd RT, Richerson PJ (2005) Not by genes alone. University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago
Boyd RT, Richerson PJ (2010) Transmission coupling mechanisms: 
cultural group selection. Philosophic Transact Royal Soc B: 
Biol Sci 365(1559):3787–3795
Brooks AS, Yellen JE, Potts R, Behrensmeyer AK, Deino AL, Leslie 
DE et al (2018) Long-distance stone transport and pigment 
use in the earliest Middle Stone age. Science 360(6384):90–94
Buskell A, Enquist M, Jansson F (2019) A systems approach to cul-
tural evolution. Palgrave Commun 5(1):1–15
Buss LW (1987) The evolution of individuality. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ
Campbell DT (1960) Blind variation and selective retention in crea-
tive thought as in other knowledge processes. Psychol Rev 
67(6):380–400
Campbell DT (1974) Evolutionary epistemology. In: Schilpp PA (ed) 
The philosophy of Karl Popper, Open Court, pp 413–463
Cavalli-Sforza LL, Feldman MW (1981) Cultural transmission and 
evolution. Stanford University Press, Stanford
Changeux J-P (1985) Neuronal man: the biology of mind. Oxford 
University Press, New York
Chudek M, Henrich J (2011) Culture-gene coevolution, norm-
psychology and the emergence of human prosociality. Trends 
Cogn Sci 15(5):218–226
Clark A, Chalmers D (1998) The extended mind. Analysis 
58(1):7–19
Clarke E (2013) The multiple realizability of biological individuals. J 
Philosophy 110(8):413–435
Clarke E (2014) Origins of evolutionary transitions. J Biosci 
39(2):303–317
Clay Z, Tennie C (2018) Is overimitation a uniquely human phenom-
enon? Insights from human children as compared to bonobos. 
Child Dev 89(5):1535–1544
Colagè I, d’Errico F (2018) Culture: the driving force of human cogni-
tion. Top Cogn Sci 12:654–672
Coward F, Grove M (2011) Beyond the tools: social innovation and 
hominin evolution. PaleoAnthropology 111–229
Croft W, Cruse DA (1987) Cognitive linguistics. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge
Csibra G, Gergely G (2009) Natural pedagogy. Trends Cogn Sci 
13(4):148–153
Csibra G, Gergely G (2011) Natural pedagogy as evolutionary adap-
tation. Philosophic Trans Royal Soc London. Series B Biol Sci 
366(1567):1149–57
Cziko G (1995) Without miracles. MIT Press, Cambridge
d’Errico F, Colagè I (2018) Cultural exaptation and cultural neural 
reuse: a mechanism for the emergence of modern culture and 
behavior. Biol Theory 13(4):213–227
Damuth J, Lorraine Heisler I (1988) Alternative formulations of 
multilevel selection. Biol Philos 3(4):407–430
Dawkins R (1983) Universal Darwinism. In: Bendall DS (ed) Evo-
lution from molecules to man. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, pp 403–425
Dawkins R (1992) Universal biology. Nature 360(6399):25–26
de Waal FBM (2013) Animal conformists. Science 340:437–438
Dorigo M, Bonabeau E, Theraulaz G (2000) Ant algorithms and 
stigmergy. Futur Gener Comput Syst 16(8):851–871
Dugatkin LA (2002) Cooperation in animals: an evolutionary over-
view. Biol Philos 17(4):459–476
Dunbar RIM (1992) Neocortex size as a constraint on group size in 
primates. J Hum Evol 22(6):469–493
Dunbar RIM (1993) Coevolution of neocortical size, group size 
and language in humans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 
16:681–735
Dunbar RIM (1998) The social brain hypothesis. Evol Anthropol 
6(5):178–190
Dunn MB (2016) Reviving the organismic analogy in sociology: 
human society as an organism. Dissertation, University of 
California Riverside
Dunstone J, Caldwell CA (2018) Cumulative culture and explicit meta-
cognition: a review of theories, evidence and key predictions. 
Palgrave Commun 4(1):1–11
Durand PM, Michod RE (2010) Genomics in the light of evolutionary 
transitions. Evolution 64(6):1533–1540
Durham WH (1992) Coevolution - genes, culture, and human diversity. 
Stanford University Press, Stanford
Edelman GM (1993) Neural Darwinism: selection and reentrant signal-
ing in higher brain function. Neuron 10(2):115–125
Eigen M, Schuster P (1977) The hypercycle. a principle of natural self-
organization. Naturwissenschaften 64:541–565
Erwin DH, Krakauer DC (2004) Insights into innovation. Science 
304:1117–1119
Féblot-Augustins J (1997) La Circulation Des Matières Premières Au 
Paléolithique: Synthèse Des Données: Perspectives Comporte-
mentales. In: Études et recherches archéologiques de l’Université 
de Liège, 75. Service de Préhistoire, Université de Liège, Liège
Feldblum J, Manfredi S, Gilby I, Pusey AE (2018) The timing and 
causes of a unique chimpanzee community fission preceding 
Gombe’s Four Years’ War. Am J Phys Anthropol 166:730–744
Feldman MW, Laland KN, Uller T, Sterelny K, Müller GB, Moczek 
A, Jablonka E, Odling-Smee J (2015) The extended evolutionary 
synthesis: its structure, assumptions and predictions. Proc Royal 
Society B Biol Sci. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1098/ rspb. 2015. 1019
Fernandes HBF, Michael A, Woodley of Menie (2017) Darwin’s Unfin-
ished Symphony: How Culture Made the Human Mind. Anim 
Behav 133:207–208
Fernando C, Szathmáry E (2010) Natural selection in the brain. In: 
Towards a theory of thinking - building blocks for a conceptual 
framework. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, pp 291–332
Did Human Culture Emerge in a Cultural Evolutionary Transition in Individuality? 
1 3
Fogarty L, Creanza N, Feldman MW (2015) Cultural evolutionary 
perspectives on creativity and human innovation. Trends Ecol 
Evol 30(12):736–754
Foley RA, Mirazón Lahr M (2011) The evolution of the diversity of 
cultures. Philosophic Trans Royal Soc London. Series B, Biol 
Sci 366(1567):1080–89
Fuentes A (2016) The extended evolutionary synthesis, ethnography, 
and the human niche: toward an integrated anthropology. Curr 
Anthropol 57(S13):S13-26
Fuentes A (2017a) Human niche, human behaviour, human nature. 
Interface Focus 7(5):1–42
Fuentes A (2017b) The creative spark: how imagination made humans 
exceptional. Penguin, New York
Furuichi T (1987) Sexual swelling, receptivity, and grouping of 
wild pygmy chimpanzee females at Wamba, Zaïre. Primates 
28(3):309–318
Gabora L, Steel M (2017) Autocatalytic networks in cognition and the 
origin of culture. J Theor Biol 431:87–95
Gabora L, Steel M (2020) Modeling a cognitive transition at the ori-
gin of cultural evolution using autocatalytic networks. Cogn Sci 
44(9):1–29
Galef BG (1992) The question of animal culture. Hum Nat 
3(2):157–178
Galef BG, Laland KN (2005) Social learning in animals : empirical 
studies and theoretical models. Bioscience 55(6):489–499
Gallagher S (2013) The socially extended mind. Cogn Syst Res 
25–26:4–12
Gánti T (1975) Organization of chemical reactions into dividing and 
metabolizing units: the chemotons. BioSystems 7(1):15–21
Gánti T (1997) Biogenesis itself. J Theor Biol 187(4):583–593
Gao X (2013) Paleolithic cultures in China: uniqueness and divergence. 
Curr Anthropol 54(SUPPL8)
Gärdenfors P, Högberg A (2017) The archaeology of teaching and the 
evolution of Homo Docens. Curr Anthropol 58(2):188–208
Gat A (2010) Why war? Motivations for fighting in the human state of 
nature. In: Kappeler PM, Silk JB (eds) Mind the gap. Springer 
Verlag, Berlin/Heidelberg, pp 197–220
Geels FW (2002) Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfigu-
ration processes: a multi-level perspective and a case-study. Res 
Policy 31(8–9):1257–1274
Gergely G, Csibra G (2006) Sylvia’s recipe: the role of imitation and 
pedagogy in the transmission of human culture. In: Enfield NJ, 
Levinson SC (eds) Roots of human sociality: culture, cognition, 
and human interaction. Berg Press, Oxford, pp 229–555
Gintis H, van Schaik CP, Boehm C (2015) Zoon Politikon. Curr 
Anthropol 56(3):327–353
Goodall J (1986) The chimpanzees of Gombe: patterns of behavior. 
Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA
Greenhill SJ, Atkinson QD, Meade A, Gray RD (2010) The shape 
and tempo of language evolution. Proc Royal Soc B Biol Sci 
277(1693):2443–2450
Grove M (2011a) Change and variability in plio-pleistocene cli-
mates: modelling the hominin response. J Archaeol Sci 
38(11):3038–3047
Grove M (2011b) Speciation, diversity, and mode 1 technologies: the 
impact of variability selection. J Hum Evol 61(3):306–319
Grove M, Coward F (2008) From individual neurons to social brains. 
Camb Archaeol J 18(3):387–400
Grove M, Pearce E, Dunbar RIM (2012) Fission-fusion and the evolu-
tion of hominin social systems. J Hum Evol 62(2):191–200
Haidle MN, Bolus M, Collard M, Conard NJ, Garofoli D, Lombard M 
et al (2015) The nature of culture: an eight-grade model for the 
evolution and expansion of cultural capacities in hominins and 
other animals. J Anthropol Sci 93:43–70
Hamilton WD (1964a) The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I. 
J Theor Biol 7:1–16
Hamilton WD (1964b) The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II. 
J Theor Biol 7:17–52
Han S, Ma Y (2015) A culture-behavior-brain loop model of human 
development. Trends Cogn Sci 19(11):666–676
Hanschen ER, Davison DR, Grochau-Wright ZI, Michod RI (2017) 
Evolution of individuality: a case study in the volvocine green 
algae. Philosophy, Theor Pract Biol 9(20170801)
Hanschen ER, Davison DR, Zachariah I, Michod RE (2018) Individual-
ity and the major evolutionary transitions. In: Landscapes of col-
lectivity in the life sciences. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 255–268
Hanschen ER, Shelton DE, Michod RE (2015) Evolutionary transitions 
in individuality and recent models of multicellularity. In: Ruiz-
Trillo I, Nedelcu AM (eds) Evolutionary transitions to multicel-
lular life. Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, pp 
165–187
Hare B (2017) Survival of the friendliest: Homo sapiens 
evolved via selection for prosociality. Ann Rev Psychol 
68(1):annurev-psych-010416–044201
Harmand S, Lewis JE, Feibel CS, Lepre CJ, Prat S, Lenoble A et al 
(2015) 3.3-million-year-old stone tools from Lomekwi 3, West 
Turkana, Kenya. Nature 521:310–315
Haun DBM, Rekers Y, Tomasello M (2012) Majority-biased transmis-
sion in chimpanzees and human children, but not orangutans. 
Curr Biol 22(8):727–731
Haun DBM, Rekers Y, Tomasello M (2014) Children conform to the 
behavior of peers; other great apes stick with what they know. 
Psychol Sci 25(12):2160–2167
Henrich J (2004) Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes 
and large-scale cooperation. J Econ Behav Organ 53:143–162
Henrich J, Boyd R (2008) Division of labor, economic specializa-
tion, and the evolution of social stratification. Curr Anthropol 
49(4):715–724
Henrich J, Gil-White FJ (2001) The evolution of prestige: freely con-
ferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of 
cultural transmission. Evol Hum Behav 22(3):165–196
Henrich J, McElreath R (2003) The evolution of cultural evolution. 
Evol Anthropol: Issues News Rev 12(3):123–135
Herrmann E, Call J, Hernàndez-Lloreda V, Hare B, Tomasello 
M (2007) Humans have evolved specialized skills of social 
cognition: the cultural intelligence hypothesis. Science 
317(5843):1360–1366
Heyes CM (2018) Cognitive gadgets. Belknap Press, Harvard Univer-
sity, Cambridge
Hill RA, Dunbar RIM (2003) Social network size in humans. Hum 
Nat 14(1):53–72
Horner V, Proctor D, Bonnie KE, Whiten A, de Waal FBM (2010) Pres-
tige affects cultural learning in chimpanzees. PLoS One 5(5):1–5
Hughes TP (1986) The seamless web: technology, science, etcetera, 
etcetera. Soc Stud Sci 16:281–292
Hull DL (1980) Individuality and selection. Annu Rev Ecol Syst 
11:311–332
Huneman P (2014) Individuality as a theoretical scheme. II. About the 
weak individuality of organisms and ecosystems. Biol Theory 
9(4):374–381
Jablonka E, Szathmáry E (1995) The evolution of information storage 
and heredity. Trends Ecol Evol 10(5):206–211
Jaeger J, Laubichler MD, Callebaut W (2015) The comet cometh: 
evolving developmental systems. Biol Theory 10(1):36–49
Jerne N (1955) The natural-selection theory of antibody formation. 
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 41(11):67–68
Jiménez ÁV, Mesoudi A (2019) Prestige-biased social learning: cur-
rent evidence and outstanding questions. Palgrave Commun 
5(1):1–12
 D. R. Davison et al.
1 3
Kalan AK, Kulik L, Arandjelovic M, Boesch C, Haas F, Dieguez P 
et al (2020) Environmental variability supports chimpanzee 
behavioural diversity. Nat Commun. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1038/ 
s41467- 020- 18176-3
Kaufhold SP, Edwin JC, Van L (2019) Why intergroup variation mat-
ters for understanding behaviour. Biol Lett 15(11)
Kendal RL, Hopper LM, Whiten A, Brosnan SF, Lambeth SP, Schapiro 
SJ, Hoppitt W (2015) Chimpanzees copy dominant and knowl-
edgeable individuals: implications for cultural diversity. Evol 
Hum Behav 36(1):65–72
Kennedy P, Baron G, Qiu B, Freitak D, Helanterä H, Hunt ER et al 
(2017) Deconstructing superorganisms and societies to address 
big questions in biology. Trends Ecol Evol 32(11):861–872
Kline MA (2015) How to learn about teaching: an evolutionary frame-
work for the study of teaching behavior in humans and other 
animals. Behav Brain Sci 38:1–70
Koops K, Schöning C, Isaji M, Hashimoto C (2015) Cultural differ-
ences in ant-dipping tool length between neighbouring chim-
panzee communities at Kalinzu, Uganda. Sci Rep 5(1):12456
Kuhn SL (2020) The evolution of Paleolithic technologies. Routledge 
(Taylor Francis), Milton Park
Kuhn SL, Stiner MC (2006) What’s a mother to do? The division of 
labor among neandertals and modern humans in Eurasia. Curr 
Anthropol 47(6):953–980
LaFreniere P, MacDonald K (2013) A post-genomic view of behav-
ioral development and adaptation to the environment. Dev Rev 
33(2):89–109
Laland KN (2017) The foundations of human cooperation in teaching 
and imitation. Spanish J Psychol 19:E100
Laland KN, Brown GR (2006) Niche construction, human behavior, 
and the adaptive-lag hypothesis. Evol Anthropol 15:95–104
Laland KN, O’Brien MJ (2015) Niche construction: implications for 
human sciences. In: Emerging trends in the social and behavioral 
sciences: an interdisciplinary, searchable, and linkable resource. 
Wiley, Hoboken, pp 1–10
Lane DA (2016) Innovation cascades: artefacts, organization and attri-
butions. Philosophic Trans Royal Soc London. Series B, Biol Sci 
371(1690):20150194
Lansing JS (1987) Balinese ‘water temples’ and the management of 
irrigation. Am Anthropol 89(2):326–341
Layton R, O’Hara S, Bilsborough A (2012) Antiquity and social func-
tions of multilevel social organization among human hunter-
gatherers. Int J Primatol 33(5):1215–1245
Leeuwen V, Edwin JC, Cronin KA, Schütte S, Call J, Haun DBM 
(2013) Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) flexibly adjust their 
behaviour in order to maximize payoffs, not to conform to major-
ities. PLoS One 8(11):1–10
Leigh EG (2010) The evolution of mutualism. J Evol Biol 
23(12):2507–2528
Lewontin RC (1970) The units of selection. Annu Rev Ecol Syst 1:1–18
Lewontin RC (1972) The apportionment of human diversity. Evol Biol 
6:381–398
Luncz LV, Boesch C (2014) Tradition over trend: neighboring chim-
panzee communities maintain differences in cultural behavior 
despite frequent immigration of adult females. Am J Primatol 
76(7):649–657
Luncz LV, Boesch C (2015) The extent of cultural variation between 
adjacent chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes verus) communities - a 
microecological approach. Am J Phys Anthropol 156(1):67–75
Lycett SJ, Collard M, McGrew WC (2009) Cladistic analyses of behav-
ioural variation in wild Pan troglodytes: exploring the chimpan-
zee culture hypothesis. J Hum Evol 57(4):337–349
Malone N, Fuentes A, White FJ (2012) Variation in the social systems 
of extant hominoids: comparative insight into the social behavior 
of early hominins. Int J Primatol 33(6):1251–1277
Marengo L, Dosi G (2005) Division of labor, organizational coordi-
nation and market mechanisms in collective problem-solving. J 
Econ Behav Organ 58(2):303–326
Maslin MA, Brierley CM, Milner AM, Shultz S, Trauth MH, Wilson 
KE (2014) East African climate pulses and early human evolu-
tion. Quatern Sci Rev 101:1–17
Maslin MA, Shultz S, Trauth MH (2015) A synthesis of the theories 
and concepts of early human evolution. Philosophic Trans Royal 
Soc London. Series B, Biol Sci 370:1–12
Maynard-Smith J, Szathmáry E (1993) The origin of chromosomes. I. 
selection for linkage. J Theor Biol 164:437–446
Maynard-Smith J, Szathmáry E (1995) Major transitions in evolution. 
W.H.Freeman Press, New York
McGrew WC (2010) In search of the last common ancestor: new find-
ings on wild chimpanzees. Philosophic Trans Royal Society B: 
Biol Sci 365(1556):3267–3276
Menary R (2010) The extended mind. In: Menary R (ed) MIT Press, 
Cambridge
Mercader J, Barton H, Gillespie J, Harris J, Kuhn SL, Tyler R, 
Boesch C (2007) 4,300-year-old chimpanzee sites and the ori-
gins of percussive stone technology. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 
104(9):3043–3048
Mercader J, Panger M, Boesch C (2002) Excavation of a chimpanzee 
stone tool site in the African rainforest. Science 296:1452–1455
Mesoudi A (2007) Biological and cultural evolution: similar but dif-
ferent. Biol Theory 2(2):119–123
Mesoudi A (2011) Cultural evolution. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago
Michod RE (1983) Population biology of the first replicators: on 
the origin of the genotype, phenotype and organism. Am Zool 
23:5–14
Michod RE (1988) Book review: Darwinian selection in the brain. 
Evolution 43(3):694–696
Michod RE (1999) Darwinian dynamics: evolutionary transitions in 
fitness and individuality. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Michod RE (2007) Evolution of individuality during the transition from 
unicellular to multicellular life. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 104 
Suppl(suppl_1):8613–8618
Michod RE, Herron MD (2006) Cooperation and conflict during evolu-
tionary transitions in individuality. J Evol Biol 19(5):1406–1409
Michod RE, Nedelcu AM (2003) On the reorganization of fitness dur-
ing evolutionary transitions in individuality. Integr Comp Biol 
43(1):64–73
Michod RE, Roze D (2001) Cooperation and conflict in the evolution 
of multicellularity. Heredity 86:1–7
Moffett MW (2013) Human identity and the evolution of societies. 
Hum Nat 24(3):219–267
Moffett MW (2019) The human swarm. Basic Books, New York
Mozzi A, Forni D, Clerici M, Pozzoli U, Mascheretti S, Guerini FR 
et al (2016) The evolutionary history of genes involved in spoken 
and written language: beyond FOXP2. Sci Rep 6:1–12
Mufwene SS (2001) The ecology of language evolution. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge
Müller V, de Boer RJ, Bonhoeffer S, Szathmáry E (2018) An evolu-
tionary perspective on the systems of adaptive immunity. Biol 
Rev 93(1):505–528
Munro ND, Bar-Oz G, Meier JS, Sapir-Hen L, Stiner MC, Yeshurun 
R (2018) The emergence of animal management in the southern 
levant. Sci Rep 8(1):9279
Muthukrishna M, Henrich J (2016) Innovation in the collective brain. 
Philosophic Trans Royal Soc B: Biol Sci 371(1690)
Nishida T, Uehara S, Nyundo R (1979) Predatory behavior among 
wild chimpanzees of the mahale mountains. Primates 20(1):1–20
Norris V, Raine DJ (1998) A fission-fusion origin for life. Origins Life 
Evol Biosphere: J Int Soc Study Origin Life 28(4–6):523–537
Did Human Culture Emerge in a Cultural Evolutionary Transition in Individuality? 
1 3
Okasha S (2006) Evolution and the levels of selection. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford
Okasha S (2007) Multilevel selection and the major transitions in evo-
lution. Philosophy of Science 72(5):1013–1025
Pigliucci M, Müller GB (eds) (2010) Evolution, the extended synthesis. 
MIT Press, Cambridge
Pobiner BL (2020) The zooarchaeology and paleoecology of early 
hominin scavenging. Evol Anthropol 29(2):68–82
Polanyi M (1967) Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Phi-
losophy. Horper Torchbooks, New York
Potts R (1998) Variability selection in hominid evolution. Evol Anthro-
pol 7(3):81–96
Potts R (2012) Environmental and behavioral evidence pertaining to 
the evolution of early homo. Curr Anthropol 53(S6):S299-317
Premo LS, Tostevin GB (2016) Cultural transmission on the taskscape: 
exploring the effects of taskscape visibility on cultural diversity. 
PLoS One 11(9):1–22
Pusey AE (1979) Intercommunity transfer of chimpanzees in Gombe 
National Park. In: Hamburg DA, McCown ER (eds) The great 
apes. Benjamin/Cummings, Menlo Park, pp 464–479
Queller DC (1997) Cooperators since life began. Q Rev Biol 
72(2):184–188
Queller DC (2000) Relatedness and the fraternal major transitions. 
Philosophic Trans Royal Soc London. Series B, Biol Sci 
355(1403):1647–55
Queller DC, Strassmann JE (2009) Beyond society: the evolution 
of organismality. Philosophic Trans Royal Soc B: Biol Sci 
364(1533):3143–3155
Querbes A, Vaesen K, Houkes W (2014) Complexity and demographic 
explanations of cumulative culture. PloS One 9(7):e102543
Radzvilavicius AL, Blackstone NW (2018) The evolution of individu-
ality revisited. Biol Rev 93(3):1620–1633
Read DW (2012) How culture makes us human: primate social evo-
lution and the formation of human societies. Left Coast Press, 
New York
Read DW (2020) From Pan to Homo sapiens: evolution from individual 
based to group based forms of social cognition, vol 19. Springer, 
Berlin/Heidelberg
Read DW, Andersson C (2019) Cultural complexity and complexity 
evolution. Adapt Behav 105971231882229.
Reindl E, Bandini E, Tennie C (2018) The latent solutions and its rela-
tion to the classics: Vygotsky and Köhler. In: Di Paolo L, Di 
Vincenzo F, De Petrillo F (eds) Evolution of primate social cog-
nition. Springer, Cham, pp 231–248
Richerson PJ, Baldini R, Bell AV, Demps K, Frost K, Hillis V et al 
(2016) Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explain-
ing human cooperation: a sketch of the evidence. Behav Brain 
Sci 39:e30
Richerson PJ, Boyd R, Bettinger RL (2001) Was agriculture impossible 
during the pleistocene but mandatory during the holocene? A 
climate change hypothesis. Am Antiq 66(3):387–411
Roche H, Blumenschine RJ, Shea JJ (2009) Origins and adaptations 
of early Homo: what archeology tells us. In: Grine FE, Fleagle 
JG, Leakey RE (eds) The first humans–origin and early evo-
lution of the genus Homo. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 135–147
Roughley N, Bayertz K (eds) (2019) The normative animal? Oxford 
University Press, Oxford
Sandén BA, Hillman KM (2011) A framework for analysis of multi-
mode interaction among technologies with examples from the 
history of alternative transport fuels in Sweden. Res Policy 
40(3):403–414
Sanz CM, Morgan DB (2007) Chimpanzee tool technology in 
the goualougo triangle, Republic of Congo. J Hum Evol 
52:420–433
Sayers K, Owen Lovejoy C (2008) The chimpanzee has no clothes. 
Curr Anthropol 49(1):87–114
Schel AM, Rawlings B, Claidière N, Wilke C, Wathan J, Richardson 
Jo, Pearson S, Herrelko ES, Whiten A, Slocombe K (2013) 
Network analysis of social changes in a captive chimpanzee 
community following the successful integration of two adult 
groups. Am J Primatol 75(3):254–266
Schiffer MB (2005) The devil is in the details: the cascade model of 
invention processes. Am Antiq 70(3):485–502
Schöning C, Humle T, Möbius Y, McGrew WC (2008) The nature 
of culture: technological variation in chimpanzee predation on 
army ants revisited. J Hum Evol 55(1):48–59
Shea N (2009) Imitation as an inheritance system. Philosophic Trans 
Royal Soc London. Series B, Biol Sci 364(1528):2429–43
Shea N, Boldt A, Bang D, Yeung N, Heyes C, Frith CD (2014) 
Supra-personal cognitive control and metacognition. Trends 
Cogn Sci 18(4):186–193
Shelton DE, Michod RE (2014) Group selection and group adap-
tation during a major evolutionary transition: insights from 
the evolution of multicellularity in the volvocine algae. Biol 
Theory 9(4):452–469
Shelton DE, Michod RE (2020) Group and individual selection dur-
ing evolutionary transitions in individuality: meanings and 
partitions. Proc Royal Soc B 20190364
Sherwood CC, Gómez-Robles A (2017) Brain plasticity and human 
evolution. Annu Rev Anthropol 46:399–419
Sherwood CC, Subiaul F, Zawidzki TW (2008) A natural history 
of the human mind: tracing evolutionary changes in brain and 
cognition. J Anat 212(4):426–454
Simon HA (1962) The architecture of complexity. Proc Am Philos 
Soc 6(106):467–482
Smaldino PE (2014) The cultural evolution of emergent group-level 
traits. Behav Brain Sci 37(3):243–254
Smith BD (2007) The ultimate ecosystem engineers. Science 
315(5820):1797–1798
Smith CM, Gabora L, Gardner-O’Kearny W (2018) The extended 
evolutionary synthesis facilitates evolutionary models of cul-
ture change. Cliodynamics: J Quant History Cult Evol 9(2)
Sober E, Wilson DS (1994) A critical review of philosophical work 
on the units of selection problem. Philosophy Sci 61:534–555
Stankiewicz R (2000) The concept of ‘design space’. In: Ziman J (ed) 
Technological innovation as an evolutionary process. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 234–247
Sterelny K (2011) Evolvability reconsidered. In: Calcott B, Sterelny 
K (eds) The major transitions in evolution revisited. MIT Press, 
Cambridge, pp 83–100
Stiner MC (2002) Carnivory, coevolution, and the geographic spread 
of the genus homo. J Archaeol Res 10(1):1–63
Stiner MC, Buitenhuis H, Duru G, Kuhn SL, Mentzer SM, Natalie 
DM et al (2014) A forager-herder trade-off, from broad-spec-
trum hunting to sheep management at Aşıklı Höyük, Turkey. 
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 111(23):8404–8409
Stiner MC, Özbaşaran M, Duru G (2021) Aşıklı Höyük : the genera-
tive evolution of a central anatolian PPN settlement in regional 
context. J Archaeol Res
Stout D, Rogers MJ, Jaeggi AV, Semaw S (2019) Archaeology and the 
origins of human cumulative culture: a case study from the Earli-
est Oldowan at Gona, Ethiopia. Curr Anthropol 60(3):309–340
Stout D, Semaw S, Rogers MJ, Cauche D (2010) Technological vari-
ation in the earliest Oldowan from Gona, Afar, Ethiopia. J Hum 
Evol 58(6):474–491
Strassmann JE, Queller DC (2010) The social organism: congresses, 
parties, and committees. Evolution 64(3):605–616
Szathmáry E (1986) The eukaryotic cell as an information integrator. 
Endocytobiosis and Cell Research 3(2):113–132
Szathmáry E (2015) Toward major evolutionary transitions theory 2.0. 
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 112(33):10104–10111
 D. R. Davison et al.
1 3
Szathmáry E, Demeter L (1987) Group selection of early replicators 
and the origin of life. J Theor Biol 128(4):463–486
Szathmáry E, Maynard-Smith J (1995) The major evolutionary transi-
tions. Nature 374(6519):227–232
Tehrani JJ, Riede F (2008) Towards an archaeology of pedagogy: learn-
ing, teaching and the generation of material culture traditions. 
World Archaeol 40(3):316–331
Tennie C, Call J, Tomasello M (2009) Ratcheting up the ratchet: on 
the evolution of cumulative culture. Philosophic Trans Royal Soc 
London. Series B, Biol Sci 364(1528):2405–15
Tennie C, Premo LS, Braun DR, McPherron SP (2017) Early stone 
tools and cultural transmission: resetting the null hypothesis. 
Curr Anthropol 58(5):000–000
Theiner G (2014) Varieties of group cognition. The Routledge Hand-
book of Embodied Cognition 362:347–358
Thompson JL, Nelson AJ (2011) Middle childhood and modern human 
origins. Hum Nat 22(3):249–280
Thompson JL, Nelson AJ (2016) Childhood and patterns of growth in 
the genus Homo. In: Meehan CL, Crittenden AN (eds) Child-
hood: origins, evolution, and implications. University of New 
Mexico Press, Albuquerque, pp 75–102
Thompson JC, Carvalho S, Marean CW, Alemseged Z (2019) Origins 
of the human predatory pattern: the transition to large-animal 
exploitation by early hominins. Curr Anthropol 60(1):1–23
Tomasello M (1996) Do apes ape? In: Heyes CM, Galef BG (eds) 
Social learning in animals: the roots of culture. Academic Press, 
San Diego, pp 319–346
Tomasello M, Davis-Dasilva M, Camak L, Bard K (1987) Observa-
tional learning of tool use by young chimpanzees and encultur-
ated chimpanzees. Hum Evol 2(1982):175–183
Tostevin GB (2007) Social intimacy, artefact visibility and accultura-
tion models of Neanderthal – modern human interaction. In: 
Mellars PA (ed) Rethinking the human revolution: new behav-
ioural and biological perspectives on the origin and dispersal 
of modern humans. McDonald Institute for Archaeological 
Research, Cambridge, pp 341–357
Tostevin GB (2019) Content matters: the materiality of cultural trans-
mission and the intersection of paleolithic archaeology with cul-
tural evolutionary theory. In: Love A, Wimsatt WC (eds) Beyond 
the meme: development and structure in cultural evolution. Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 311–364
Traulsen A, Nowak MA (2006) Evolution of cooperation by multilevel 
selection. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 103(29):10952–10955
Ungar PS, Grine FE, Teaford MF (2006) Diet in early homo : a review 
of the evidence and a new model of adaptive versatility. Annu 
Rev Anthropol 35(1):209–228
van de Waal E (2018) On the neglected behavioural variation among 
neighbouring primate groups. Ethology 124(12):845–854
van de Waal E, Borgeaud C, Whiten A (2013) Potent social learning 
and conformity shape a wild primate’s foraging decisions. Sci-
ence 340(6131):483–485
van Leeuwen EJC, Cronin KA, Daniel BM, Haun RM, Bodamer MD 
(2012) Neighbouring chimpanzee communities show different 
preferences in social grooming behaviour. Proc Royal Soc b: Biol 
Sci 279(1746):4362–4367
van Schaik CP (2016) The primate origins of human nature. Wiley, 
Hoboken
van de Waal E, Renevey N, Favre CM, Bshary R (2010) Selective 
attention to philopatric models causes directed social learn-
ing in wild vervet monkeys. Proceed Royal Soc B: Biol Sci 
277(1691):2105–2111
Watson SK, Reamer LA, Mareno MC, Vale G, Harrison RA, Lambeth 
SP et al (2017) Socially transmitted diffusion of a novel behavior 
from subordinate chimpanzees. Am J Primatol 79(6):1–10
West-Eberhard MJ (2003) Developmental plasticity and evolution. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford
West SA, Toby Kiers E (2009) Evolution: what is an organism? Curr 
Biol 19(23):R1080–R1082
Whiten A (2005) The second inheritance system of chimpanzees and 
humans. Nature 437(7055):52–55
Whiten A, Erdal D (2012) the human socio-cognitive niche and its 
evolutionary origins. Philosophic Trans Royal Soc B: Biol Sci 
367(1599):2119–2129
Whiten A, Goodall J, McGrew WC, Toshisada N, Reynoldsk V, Sugiy-
ama Y et al (1999) Cultures in chimpanzees. Nature 399:15–18
Whiten A, Goodall J, McGrew WC, Toshisada N, Reynoldsk V, Sugiy-
ama Y et al (2001) Charting cultural variation in chimpanzees. 
Behaviour 138(11):1481–1516
Whiten A, Horner V, Marshall-Pescini S (2003) Cultural panthropol-
ogy. Evol Anthropol 12(2):92–105
Whiten A, Horner V, de Waal FBM (2005) Conformity to cultural 
norms of tool use in chimpanzees. Nature 437(7059):737–740
Whiten A, McGuigan N, Marshall-Pescini S, Hopper LM (2009) Emu-
lation, imitation, over-imitation and the scope of culture for child 
and chimpanzee. Philosophic Trans Royal Soc London. Series B, 
Biol Sci 364(1528):2417–28
Williams GC (1966) Adaptation and natural selection. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford
Wilson ML (2013) Chimpanzees, warfare, and the invention of peace. 
In: Fry DP (ed) War, peace, and human nature: the convergence 
of evolutionary and cultural views. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, pp 361–388
Wilson ML, Wrangham RW (2003) Intergroup relations in chimpan-
zees. Annu Rev Anthropol 32(1):363–392
Wimsatt WC (1975) Complexity and organization. In: Topics in the 
philosophy of biology. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp 174–193
Wimsatt WC, Griesemer JR (2007) Reproducing entrenchments to scaf-
fold culture: the central role of development in cultural evolu-
tion. In: Sansom R, Brandon RN (eds) Integrating evolution and 
development: from theory to practice. MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA, pp 227–323
Wrangham RW (1979) On the evolution of ape social systems. Soc Sci 
Inf 18(3):336–368
Zeder MA 2012 Pathways to animal domestication. In: Gepts P, Famula 
TR, Bettinger RL, Brush SB, Damania AB, McGuire PE, Qualset 
CO (eds) Biodiversity in agriculture: domestication, evolution 
and sustainability. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 
227–259
Zeder MA (2015) Core questions in domestication research. Proc Natl 
Acad Sci USA 112(11):3191–3198
Zeder MA (2018) Why evolutionary biology needs anthropology: eval-
uating core assumptions of the extended evolutionary synthesis. 
Evol Anthropol: Issues News Rev 27(6):267–284
Ziman J (2000) Technological innovation as an evolutionary process. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to 
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
